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Foreword 
Frances Ruane 
The annual Budget Perspectives Conference provides a forum for discussing key 
public policy issues of both immediate and longer term concern. In the context of 
the current fiscal and economic crisis, research insights are needed at both the 
macro and micro level. The former are central to understanding and managing the 
significant reductions in the budget deficit needed to put Ireland's public finances on 
a sustainable footing. The latter are essential because a successful budgetary 
adjustment requires restructuring of both public expenditure and taxation. This in 
turn requires that policy adjustments take full account of both efficiency and equity 
issue and are seen to do so. The research papers presented at this year's annual 
Budget Perspectives Conference continue in this tradition, providing an opportunity 
for policymakers, social partners and researchers to engage with some of the major 
current issues.  
 
In the opening session of the conference, David Duffy sets out the economic context 
in which the Minister for Finance will frame the 2013 Budget. This draws on the 
recently published Quarterly Economic Commentary (see www.esri.ie). While the 
context looks somewhat more favourable to that in which the Budget 2012 was 
framed, it remains uncertain due to the slow rate of progress in resolving the Euro-
area challenges.  
 
The second paper, by John FitzGerald (ESRI), looks specifically at the fiscal position 
out to 2015 and explores what should happen beyond that date. The paper reviews 
progress to date in stabilising the public finances, and argues for retaining our fiscal 
stance even if growth in the Euro Area undermines our meeting the specific targets 
that have been set. As long as there is no new information suggesting that structural 
deficit is higher than had been anticipated, there are merits in sticking with the 
medium term fiscal plan. The paper suggests that it would make sense to run a fiscal 
surplus over the economic cycle post 2015, with the aim of reducing the debt to 
prepare for the increasing costs of ageing, especially post-2030, and to make the 
economy more robust to any future shocks.  
 
Turning to the micro analysis, a paper by Mike Brewer, James Browne and Wenchao 
Jin (University of Essex and Institute for Fiscal Studies) explores the implications of 
UK proposals for a "Universal Credit", which plans to integrate means-tested welfare 
benefits and in-work tax credits for working-age adults into a single programme in 
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2013. Many of the issues examined have parallels in the Irish context, where moves 
to a Single Working Age Payment are under consideration. 
 
The final paper by Tim Callan, Claire Keane, Michael Savage, John Walsh and Kevin 
Timoney (ESRI) uses the ESRI's tax-benefit model to build a nationally representative 
profile of financial incentives to work in Ireland. This paper builds on earlier research 
in this area, presented at various Budget Perspectives Conferences over the past 
decade. 
 
This paper focuses specifically on three topics. Firstly, it reviews how OECD data and 
analysis, based on illustrative examples, and not properly weighting the composition 
of Irish unemployment, overestimate replacement rates for Ireland: when 
appropriate adjustments are made, Ireland's replacement rates are in the middle of 
the European rankings. Secondly, microsimulation estimates for the UK and Ireland 
also suggest that the extent of high replacement rates is similar in the two 
jurisdictions – with Rent and Mortgage Supplement generating very high 
replacement rates in Ireland. Thirdly, estimates of replacement rates based on new 
CSO data for 2010, uprated to 2012, take into account the cost of childcare and 
travel to work. Even when these are taken into account, the paper finds that over 90 
per cent of Irish people are better off in work than out of work. 
 
Copies of the presentations at the conference can be found on the ESRI website at 
http://www.esri.ie/research/research_areas/taxation_welfare_and_pensions/  
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1. Fiscal Policy for 2013 and Beyond  
 
John FitzGerald 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The problems for Ireland today are very different from the problems of the last 
decade and, as a consequence, the priorities for fiscal policy in 2013 are very 
different. Instead of concerns about potential housing market bubbles, the issue 
today is how fiscal policy can best restore the public finances to sustainability and 
the wider economy to growth. The trajectory chosen for the restoration of 
sustainable public finances must take account of a range of factors, which will impact 
on the welfare of the Irish population. This paper considers the appropriate stance of 
fiscal policy for 2013 and subsequent years. 
 
The economic crisis in Ireland is the most serious since the Second World War. While 
the fall in output has been greatly affected by the wider recession in the EU, the 
position of Ireland is particularly difficult because of multiple policy mistakes made 
over the past decade. A combination of inappropriate fiscal policy and a failure of 
financial regulation have resulted today in a legacy of huge government debts and a 
very large government borrowing requirement. While a substantial part of the 
increase in indebtedness since 2007 is directly attributable to the banking crisis 
(approximately 40 percentage points of GDP), a majority of the debt is the result of 
the dramatic deficit in the government's finances since 2007.  
 
The challenge which has faced successive Irish governments since 2008 is how to 
return the public finances to a sustainable path by means of appropriate fiscal policy 
and how to bring the banking crisis under control. This imperative is not imposed 
from outside. Even before aid was sought from the EU Commission, the ECB and the 
IMF (the Troika)1, it was clear what needed to be done. While the broad parameters 
for fiscal policy are now enshrined in a series of agreements and laws, there still 
remain fiscal policy choices open to the government. This paper considers the 
appropriate stance of fiscal policy over the coming years within the context of the EU 
legal framework and the related agreement with Ireland's partners in the Troika. In 
making these fiscal policy choices, consideration must be given to how they will 
affect growth in Ireland in the medium term. 
 
 
1  The UK, Swedish and Danish governments have also provided bilateral support. 
2  | Budget  Persp ect ives  2013  
Section 2 of this paper considers the EU rules on fiscal policy, which now form the 
essential backdrop for Irish policy making. In Section 3 the problems in measuring 
the fiscal stance are discussed and the magnitude of the adjustment made to date is 
assessed. Section 4 considers the lessons from the past experience with large scale 
fiscal adjustment in Ireland and elsewhere. Section 5 looks at the fiscal adjustment in 
Ireland to date and Section 6 draws conclusions on the appropriate approach to 
fiscal policy in Ireland over the next few years. 
 
2 FISCAL RULES 
Fiscal policy in Ireland must be framed within the context of a series of EU and 
domestic regulations. This framework includes the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), 
as updated and enhanced by the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in 
the EMU. However, for Ireland, the key set of rules governing fiscal policy out to 
2015 is contained within the agreement reached with the Troika in December 2010. 
Once the fiscal adjustment set out in this agreement has been completed by bringing 
the deficit within the limits placed by the Stability and Growth Pact (a deficit of no 
more than 3% of GDP), the Treaty rules will then apply to Irish fiscal policy.2  
 
The agreement with the Troika on how the Irish fiscal position is to be brought into 
conformity with the Treaty, sets out the key parameters within which Irish fiscal 
policy is to be developed, including the broad path of adjustment of the deficit to be 
achieved over the period to 2015. This plan is designed to bring the government 
deficit under the SGP limit of 3 per cent of GDP by that date. In particular it specifies 
in billions of euro the amount of fiscal "effort" to be undertaken each year to 2015. It 
is this latter commitment on fiscal "effort" which is especially binding.3 
 
The present plan sees the final stage of the adjustment being completed in 2016 or 
2017. While this agreement on the fiscal "effort" each year is binding as a lower 
limit, it is open to the Irish government to undertake a more rapid adjustment than 
specified. It is also open to the Irish government to choose the fiscal instruments, 
taxes and expenditure, that it uses to meet the target in each year.4  
 
 
2  The debt reduction benchmark in the Treaty comes into play from 2018 onwards. 
3  The IMF in their summer 2012 report said, "Staff continues to support the accommodation of revenue shortfalls in the 
event of significantly weaker growth out-turn in order to protect the fragile economic recovery, and spreading over 
subsequent years the closure of any emerging fiscal gap arising from this accommodation." IMF, 2012, paragraph 33. In 
other words, if the deficit target was missed because of a cyclical downturn, additional fiscal measures might not be 
appropriate. However, it is not clear how the EU Commission or the ECB would view such a shortfall. 
4  While the composition of the adjustment needs to be discussed with the Troika, it is clear that, in practise, they generally 
leave it to the Irish government to decide the precise mix of measures. 
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Once Ireland conforms to the Treaty requirements and what is called the EU 
"excessive deficits procedure" ends at the end of 2015 (because the deficit has been 
reduced below 3 per cent of GDP), the Treaty rules themselves will provide the 
framework for fiscal policy choices in subsequent years. 
 
The fiscal rules which underpinned EMU since its foundation were enshrined in the 
Stability and Growth Pact. These rules placed a limit on the government deficit of 3 
per cent of GDP and the government was meant to balance its budget over the cycle. 
However, over the last decade a number of countries, among them Germany and 
France, broke these rules without facing serious consequences. In the case of 
Ireland, up to the current crisis these rules were generally observed. However, as 
discussed later, this did not mean that fiscal policy was either wise or safe. The 
position in Spain was rather similar to that in Ireland, with the government running 
surpluses in 2005-7, Conefrey and FitzGerald, 2010. 
 
However, the existence of the SGP rules and the fact that the government was 
observing them gave a false sense of security in both Ireland and Spain. It also meant 
that key external observers of the Irish economy tended to look first to the rules and 
their implementation rather than to the innate wisdom of domestic fiscal policy. 
O'Leary, 2009, has analysed the contemporary assessment made by the IMF and the 
EU of Irish fiscal policy and he shows that these external observers did not pick up 
the dangers inherent in the very rapid growth then under way. The presence of the 
fiscal rules, embodied in the SGP, provided a smoke screen distracting observers 
from what was really happening. This highlights the potential danger of relying too 
much on simple rules, whether the rules are those enshrined in the SGP or in the 
Treaty passed earlier this year. The wisdom of fiscal policy still needs to be tested 
against a broader range of indicators. 
 
The origin of the recent Treaty establishing enhanced fiscal rules for the EU lies in 
the current crisis, which has demonstrated a serious failure in public policy in many 
EU members. The need for enhanced solidarity between EU members, arising from 
the crisis, has seen the provision of very substantial loans on generous terms by the 
bulk of EMU members to Ireland, Portugal and Greece. In turn, the lenders have 
understandable concerns that measures be taken to ensure that these loans will be 
repaid: hence the desire of the creditor countries to see all EMU members 
incorporate legal restrictions on fiscal policy in their states, which will ensure that 
loans will be capable of being repaid.  
 
However, in developing the rules to ensure that lenders get their money back, the 
origins of the current crisis have been ignored. In the case of Ireland and Spain (and 
also in the case of some other EU members outside the EMU) the best indicator of 
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economic dangers was the rapidly rising imbalance on the current account of the 
balance of payments. This indicator does not figure in the treaty. Thus nothing in the 
Treaty would prevent a repetition of the current disasters in Ireland and Spain. 
However, the EU Commission is also empowered to start an "excessive imbalances 
procedure" in the future, should it feel that it is appropriate. While much weaker 
than the Treaty provisions, this does give scope for action at an EU level if fiscal 
policy mistakes were to be made in the future along the lines of the mistakes made 
in Ireland and Spain over the last decade. 
 
3 MEASURING FISCAL STANCE 
It is important to consider how fiscal policy – high level decisions on taxation and 
expenditure – actually impacts on the macro-economy. A frequently expressed view 
equates a government deficit with a stimulatory policy and a government surplus 
with a contractionary policy – this is an inappropriate simplification.5 In fact, a 
surplus could actually reflect a stimulatory fiscal policy, where the government, 
through tax and spending policies, was raising the level of demand in the economy. A 
deficit could also reflect a contractionary policy, as it does today, where the 
government is implementing major cuts. While the government over much of the 
last decade observed the Stability and Growth Pact by running a surplus, it was 
actually pursuing a stimulatory policy, adding to demand in an inappropriate 
manner, Kearney, 2012. This was because the surplus arose from exceptional 
revenues that resulted from an abnormally high level of activity in the economy. By 
contrast, the fact that the government is today running a huge deficit does not mean 
that the government is stimulating the economy. In fact, the large deficit masks a 
fiscal policy which, of necessity, involves raising taxation and cutting expenditure – 
taking more money out of the economy - with a major negative impact on domestic 
demand. 
To understand the impact that fiscal policy has on the economy using published data 
takes some unravelling.  
 
Firstly the data that are most readily available on the public finances do not properly 
capture what is going on. Government accounting practises date back to the 19th 
century British administration. To understand what is going on, it is necessary to use 
data on a standard national accounting basis. These data are consistent and readily 
reconcilable with the approach used by the EU Commission. However, because the 
budgetary process is not based on these data, they appear with a significant lag. 
Among other things, these national accounting data avoid double counting as they 
net out transfers within the government sector and they include extra-budgetary 
 
5  This was clearly explained in an Irish context almost forty years ago in a paper by Dowling, 1978. 
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funds, which are properly part of the government sector. 6 It would help the policy 
making process if the approach to government accounting in Ireland was changed so 
that the data published in a timely manner better reflected what was actually 
happening, FitzGerald, 1986 and 2012a. In particular, it would help inform debate on 
fiscal policy in the Oireachtas and in civil society generally. 
 
Secondly, to estimate the macro-economic impact of fiscal policy it is important to 
separate the effects of the economy on the public finances from the effects of 
discretionary changes in fiscal policy on the wider economy – separate the chicken 
from the egg! The recent EU Treaty on fiscal responsibility acknowledges the 
importance of this task by casting targets for government borrowing in terms of the 
structural deficit7. However, while this is the correct approach to understanding 
what fiscal policy is doing, it is difficult to implement in practise.  
 
One example of the approach used to calculate the structural deficit is that 
employed by the EU Commission. They derive the structural deficit by applying the 
same economic model to each member state; some of the key parameters in the 
model are identical for each country, in spite of clear differences in economic 
structure. They use this model to first calculate potential output – the level of output 
that is sustainable on a long-term basis. They then calculate the implications of this 
level of output for the public finances and show the difference compared to the 
actual outturn for a particular year (where the actual outturn is conditional on actual 
rather than potential output). The difference between the structural deficit and the 
actual deficit is then attributed to cyclical factors.  
 
However, there are a number of problems with this approach when it is applied to 
the Irish economy, Bergin, et al., 2010a and 2010b. The structure of the Irish 
economy is different from that of other economies in terms of the share of capital 
and labour in value added. Also, these shares are changing over time, rather than 
being constant. However, the most serious problem with the EU mandated 
methodology8 is that it derives the "non-accelerating wage rate of unemployment" 
(NAWRU), a crucial element of the model, using a moving average of past 
unemployment rates. As the process gives a substantial weight to recent experience, 
it produced a very low NAWRU for Ireland up to the crisis, underestimating the 
inflationary pressures in the labour market. By contrast, it produces a very high 
 
6  Last year the government national debt figure double counted one element of the debt because of a failure to take 
account of the complexities of the accounting approach being used. See http://www.finance.gov.ie/documents/ 
publications/reports/2012/externalrevdept.pdf. 
7  The structural deficit is the deficit that would exist if the economy was producing at its potential. The difference between 
the actual deficit and the structural deficit is then attributed to cyclical factors, which result in the economy producing 
below potential. 
8  EU officials stress that this is the methodology they are mandated to use. In private they accept that it has limitations and 
they do not claim that it is appropriate for all countries and all circumstances. 
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structural (NAWRU) unemployment rate for Ireland after the crisis that takes no 
account of how the labour market actually operates. In turn, this produces very 
strange results for potential output. 
 
As long ago as 2003, the Department of Finance drew attention to the problems with 
the methodology used by the EU Commission, Department of Finance, 2003. When 
the methodology was applied to Ireland it produced perverse results. For example, 
the Stability Programme Updates using this methodology published with the Budgets 
for 2005, 2006 and 2007 all suggested that budgetary policy in the relevant year was 
contractionary whereas, as Kearney 2012 shows, it was expansionary. De facto the 
Department of Finance, in repeatedly raising concerns with the methodology, 
recognised that this was an incorrect conclusion. If anyone had believed this 
interpretation of the economy they would have concluded that fiscal policy was 
appropriate whereas, even at the time, it was clear that it was too stimulatory, 
FitzGerald et al. 2005. This year, in the Stability Programme Update published with 
Budget 2012, the application of the EU methodology to Ireland suggested that that 
the Irish economy would show signs of overheating in 2014 and 2015. In the face of 
such a conclusion, the Department of Finance, in a rather deadpan way, said that 
such a conclusion "does not appear realistic". 
 
FIGURE 1 Estimate of Fiscal Stance 
 
 
Source:  Kearney, 2012. 
 
There is a range of different approaches to estimating the impact of fiscal policy on 
the economy and Kearney et al., 2000, discussed their advantages and 
disadvantages. Kearney, 2012, has applied one of these approaches, which appears 
robust and straightforward, to derive the results set out in Figure 1. In that paper she 
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used the indexation rules in the HERMES macro-economic model to compare what 
would have happened to government borrowing each year if the government had 
adopted a "neutral" budgetary stance – neither pumping money into the economy 
through discretionary changes nor taking it out – with the actual outturn. In this case 
a neutral policy is characterised as one where there is no change in tax rates 
(excepting indexation of specific excise taxes) and no change in real welfare rates9 or 
in the volume of government expenditure. 
 
The results, shown in Figure 1, indicate that the budgets of 2010-2012 were seriously 
contractionary, given the amount of money that the government, of necessity, had 
to take out of the economy. This come as no surprise. However, on the face of it, the 
rather limited contraction arising from the 2009 budget looks surprising. The fact 
that the 2009 budget was not seriously contractionary was due to the fact that 
prices were falling. This meant that, even with cuts in expenditure in nominal terms, 
the real value of that expenditure in some cases increased. This was particularly 
important in the case of transfers (welfare payments). While payment rates were 
held constant (or suffered a limited reduction), the real value of the transfers 
increased and this is reflected in the results in Callan et al., 2012. The analysis in this 
latter paper indicates that the 2009-11 budgets, when taken together, were quite 
redistributive in their impact. 
 
Kearney, 2012, also puts the current fiscal adjustment in the context of the previous 
major fiscal adjustment in Ireland in the 1980s. This shows that the current period of 
fiscal adjustment, while more severe than that of the average of the 1982-6 period, 
is actually less severe than the adjustment over the period 1987-9. While this does 
not make the current period of austerity feel any better, the fact that the economy 
recovered in the 1990s from the after effects of the cuts of the 1980s does provide 
some reassurance that austerity does not necessarily do serious lasting damage to 
the potential growth rate of the economy10.  
 
Having identified the size of the "discretionary" change in fiscal stance in each of the 
years 2010-2012, it is useful to consider what has been the impact of this "austerity" 
on the wider macro-economy. In modelling the impact of a tightening of fiscal policy 
in any country there are four main channels through which it can affect output.  
 
 
9  Hermes uses a weighted average of the private consumption deflator and the average wage rate to index welfare 
payments. 
10  The economy in 1990 was significantly below EU average output levels leaving significant scope for catch up. This is not 
the case today. 
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Firstly, a contractionary fiscal policy, by taking money out of the economy, serves to 
reduce domestic demand. In turn, this has negative multiplier effects affecting 
output and employment. While in a small and very open economy these effects will 
be more limited than in closed economies, Barrell, et al., 2009,, they are, 
nonetheless, quite significant. Such a contraction in domestic demand has other 
more complex effects on the economy. For example, it reduces inflationary 
pressures, especially in the labour market, improving competitiveness and raising 
potential output in the future. To estimate the final impact on an economy of a 
contractionary fiscal policy requires an economic model that captures these different 
mechanisms. Below we describe the results obtained using the HERMES model to 
undertake this analysis for Ireland.11  
 
Secondly, where a country has a separate currency with an independent Central 
Bank and a separate monetary policy, a tightening of fiscal policy, ceteris paribus, 
will generally result in a loosening in monetary policy.12 This is because a tightening 
of fiscal policy has a deflationary effect allowing the Central Bank to cut interest 
rates. Such a loosening can, to some extent, offset the negative impact on domestic 
demand of the fiscal tightening. However, this is not applicable to individual EMU 
members as the ECB sets monetary policy conditional on inflation expectations at 
the level of the Euro Area. Thus fiscal action in any individual member of the EMU 
will not result in offsetting monetary policy action by the ECB. In addition, when 
interest rates are already very low (as they are in EMU, the UK and the US), it is not 
possible to use standard monetary policy to offset a contractionary fiscal policy. 
 
The third channel through which fiscal policy can affect the economy is by means of 
its effect on financial markets' perception of risk. Before EMU, the potential effects 
of exchange rate changes resulted in a substantial risk premium attaching to cross 
border lending. However, with the advent of EMU and the ending of exchange rate 
risk this channel was largely ignored within EMU until the crisis hit.13 However, since 
2008 we have seen how the bond markets have reacted in an extreme manner to 
the uncertain state of the public finances in countries such as Ireland. It is now clear 
that financial markets' perceptions concerning the sustainability of the public 
finances in Ireland have had a very big impact on interest rates. For example, the 
high risk premium charged on government borrowing in Ireland and Spain is also 
 
11  The HERMES model was specifically designed for such a task, Bradley et al., 1993 and Bergin et al., 2003. The results 
discussed here are based on the work of Kearney, 2012. 
12  This depends on the objectives of the Central Bank. 
13  Honohan, 1999, considering the pre-EMU period, comments on how interest rates in Ireland rose in 1986 when it 
appeared that fiscal action to tackle the deficit might be abandoned by an incoming government. (In fact, the new 
government redoubled the efforts at fiscal adjustment and interest rates fell when this became clear.) 
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affecting domestic utilities and business in those economies.14 What this means is 
that even within EMU, the interest rate charged to the government, and also to 
domestic agents, is affected by fiscal policy. A sustained reduction in borrowing will, 
over time, produce a reduction in interest rates. When this factor is taken into 
account, it significantly affects the interpretation of the more standard multiplier 
approach to assessing the impact of fiscal policy. The IMF in their World Economic 
Outlook provided a good discussion of the literature on the importance of this 
channel, IMF, 2010. This issue was addressed in Bergin et al., 2010b in analysing the 
impact of the fiscal policy stance on the Irish economy. 
 
The fourth channel by which fiscal policy affects the economy is through its effect on 
the stock of debt. While borrowing money to fund expenditure in the current year 
may raise demand and GDP, the interest paid on that debt in future years will reduce 
growth in the second and subsequent years. Whether the effect on national welfare 
of the cumulative cost of future interest payments offsets the benefits of the impact 
effect of the stimulus depends on the rate of interest paid and the rate of time 
discount of the public. 
 
Here we analyse the possible impact of the fiscal policy stance for the years 2010-
2012 taking account of only the first channel – the multiplier effects on domestic 
demand. The major drawback to this analysis is that, while it captures the negative 
impact effects of the austerity, it takes no account of the impact of the austerity on 
interest rates for government borrowing in the long term, where domestic 
government bond rates include a very substantial risk premium relative to German 
rates. However, this analysis is, nonetheless, useful in helping understand the recent 
performance of the Irish economy, in particular in the year in which the cuts were 
implemented.  
 
Since Ireland entered into the agreement with the Troika in December 2010, interest 
rates for government borrowing have been set exogenously as part of that evolving 
agreement with the lenders. Thus government interest rates in the short run in 
Ireland have not been directly reduced as a result of the contractionary stance of 
fiscal policy.15 This has meant that the full negative multiplier impact of the 
contractionary fiscal stance has been felt by the economy. However, we are seeing 
how fiscal policy action to bring the public finances under control is beginning to 
influence the market rate for government bonds. It is this latter rate which will be 
 
14  The contrast between the experience of Irish companies and companies in stronger EMU member states is illustrated by 
what happened in the first week in September 2012 when the Irish Electricity Supply Board raised funds at 6.25% a year 
whereas Electricité de France paid 2.7%. 
15  However, it is clear that the Troika would not have funded the Irish adjustment without such a fiscal stance- the cut in 
interest rates came before much of the adjustment. 
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relevant if and when the Irish government returns to funding itself on the market 
from 2014 onwards. 
 
Here we use the HERMES model to analyse the impact of the discretionary changes 
in fiscal policy, shown in Figure 1, over the period 2010 to 2012. The discretionary 
changes in different categories of taxation and different categories of expenditure 
were analysed in Kearney, 2012, and we use the model analysis underlying that 
paper to estimate the overall multiplier effect. When the effects of the different 
fiscal measures are aggregated for each year we arrive at the overall impact on the 
economy in that year. For simplicity we do not consider the effects in the second and 
subsequent years after each budget. 
 
The results suggest that the effect of discretionary fiscal policy on the growth of GDP 
ranged from minus 0.6 per cent in 2010 to minus 1.0 per cent in 2012. Thus, in the 
absence of the necessary contractionary fiscal policy, there would have been no fall 
in output in 2010 and real growth in 2011. This year, 2012, the effect of the 
necessary tightening of fiscal policy is to reduce the rate of growth in GDP from 
around 3 per cent to the current forecast of 2 per cent. As indicated above, these 
estimates take no account of favourable effects of austerity on interest rates, future 
interest payments and, hence, future growth.  
 
4 PAST EXPERIENCE OF FISCAL ADJUSTMENTS 
In understanding how the current sustained period of fiscal adjustment may affect 
the economy, it is useful to look at previous Irish experience in the 1980s and also at 
the experience of one or two other countries that also had periods of sustained 
adjustment. The Irish experience of fiscal adjustment in the 1980s has been analysed 
in many papers (Honohan, 1999 and Honohan and Walsh, 2002, Perotti, 2011). Some 
of the conclusions drawn in early research in the 1990s (the "expansionary fiscal 
contraction") have not stood the test of time.16  
 
A good summary of the literature on fiscal adjustment is provided in IMF, 2010. 
Among the more robust conclusions are that fiscal consolidation is, generally, 
contractionary, Guajardo, Leigh and Pescatori, 2011, and cutting expenditure is 
generally more successful than increasing taxes. If nothing else, because of the 
difficulty in implementing cuts in expenditure their implementation demonstrates 
greater commitment to reform than increases in taxation; this may prove more 
convincing to citizens and to markets. In practice, both cuts in expenditure and 
increases in taxation are generally necessary for a successful adjustment. Because of 
 
16  See Bradley and Whelan, 1997. 
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the low tax take in Ireland at the beginning of the current crisis both Honohan, 2008, 
and Lane, 2008, recommended increasing taxation as well as cutting expenditure as 
part of the necessary fiscal adjustment this time out. 
 
In the last major economic crisis in Ireland, the early 1983-4 period of that crisis saw 
increases in taxation and cuts in capital expenditure, but no major cuts in current 
expenditure. As Kearney, 2012, shows, there was then a premature easing off in the 
fiscal adjustment in 1986 and it had to be recommenced with renewed vigour in the 
1987-9 period. In this latter period a major part of the adjustment involved cuts in 
current expenditure. With the benefit of hindsight it would have been better to have 
undertaken the 1980s adjustment in a tighter time scale, Honohan, 1999. Also, in the 
initial phase it should have prioritised cuts in current expenditure. Nonetheless, the 
adjustment of the 1980s also necessitated an increase in taxation, though this 
increase should have been implemented in a different manner than was actually the 
case, Honohan and Irvine, 1987. 
 
The experience of Ireland in the 1980s and of Finland and the UK in the 1990s is 
interesting in the current context as they all had to undertake large fiscal and current 
account adjustments. This is similar to the situation in Ireland and Spain in 2008 and 
2009. In each case the countries involved were living beyond their means and both 
the imbalance on the current account of the balance of payments and the imbalance 
in the government accounts needed to be addressed. 
 
FIGURE 2 Adjustment in Government Borrowing and in the Current Account, Ireland and Finland 
 
 
 
On the x axis the years are numbered from the beginning of the adjustment in each country. 
Source: EU AMECO database. 
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The experience of Ireland in the 1980s, and Finland and the UK in the early 1990s all 
suggest a certain pattern to such adjustments. The tough fiscal adjustment, when 
commenced, results in a major fall in domestic demand affecting output (GDP). In 
turn, this results in a big improvement in the current account of the balance of 
payments (Figures 2 and 3). This initial improvement in the current account normally 
occurs as a result of the reduction in domestic demand and, hence, in imports. 
However, the improvement in the underlying government structural deficit is 
masked by the negative cyclical effects of the reduction in growth arising from the 
contraction in domestic demand. It is only when the necessary adjustment in the 
structural deficit nears completion, and the negative multiplier effects of the 
contractionary fiscal policy ease off, that the full reduction in government borrowing 
becomes apparent. 
 
FIGURE 3 Adjustment in Government Borrowing and in the Current Account, Ireland and the UK 
 
 
On the x axis the years are numbered from the beginning of the adjustment in each country.  
Source: EU AMECO database. 
 
Figure 2 shows the path of government borrowing and the balance on current 
account for Ireland over the years 1981-1991 and compares it to the adjustment in 
Finland between the years 1989 and 1999. Figure 3 compares Irish adjustment in the 
1980s with that in the UK between the years 1989 and 1999. In these three cases the 
adjustment first took place in the current account balance, as contractionary fiscal 
policy affected growth and domestic demand. This, in turn, affected the government 
accounts in a negative feedback loop. This meant that much of the reduction in the 
government structural deficit was initially offset by a rise in the cyclical deficit. It is 
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only once the contractionary fiscal policy neared completion that the cyclical effects 
on the deficit disappeared and the actual deficit then improved more rapidly. 
 
In each case the adjustments took the best part of a decade and the improvement in 
the current account preceded the improvement in the government balance. When 
accompanied by world growth, as was the case for Ireland in the late 1980s, the 
adjustment was less painful. In the case of Finland the fact that there was also a 
financial crisis aggravated the initial loss in output. Also, in these three cases the 
exchange rates of the relevant economies were not fixed. 
 
We are seeing a rather similar adjustment pattern in Ireland in recent years. There 
has already been a very substantial turnaround in the current account of the balance 
of payments in Ireland, with a substantial surplus in prospect this year, following on 
surpluses in 2010 and 2011. The progress on government borrowing, as measured by 
the actual deficit rather than the structural deficit, is much slower. However, if 
Ireland in the future follows the pattern of these three earlier adjustment episodes, 
once the structural deficit has been eliminated and austerity ends, a return to 
"normal" growth is likely to result in a further reduction in the cyclical component of 
the deficit.  
 
5 FISCAL ADJUSTMENT TO DATE 
From the summer of 2008 onwards the Irish fiscal position deteriorated very rapidly. 
Beginning in autumn 2008 with the Budget for 2009, the authorities responded to 
this deterioration with an austerity package designed to stabilise the deficit. 
However, the speed with which the deficit widened over the autumn and winter of 
2008, even in the face of these measures, warranted a supplementary budget in the 
spring of 2009. It was not until 2010 that the measures undertaken were sufficient to 
see the deficit begin to stabilise (excluding once-off funding for the banking system). 
Table 1 summarises the ex ante17 measures undertaken over the period 2008-2012; 
in total they were equivalent to almost €24 billion or 14.8 per cent of GDP18. By the 
end of 2010 the general government deficit had stabilised, albeit at the very high 
level of 11 per cent of GDP (excluding costs of bank recapitalisation).  
 
In November 2010, the then Irish government published plans for a fiscal adjustment 
programme for the period 2011 to 2015. This was designed to bring the deficit below 
 
17  As discussed later, the effect of announced cuts on the government deficit is typically substantially less than the amount 
of the actual cut because of the negative multiplier effects. In addition, many "changes" in government expenditure and 
taxation are not meaningful changes in an economic sense as they are just compensating for the effects of inflation – they 
don't involve a volume change. 
18  The total fiscal adjustment is first expressed as a percentage of the nominal GDP for each year and the numbers for each 
individual year are then summed to give the period total. 
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3 per cent of GDP by the end of the adjustment period in 2015. This plan was then 
adopted without significant change in December 2010 as part of an agreement 
underpinning the package of loans from the EU/IMF designed to help fund Irish debt 
over the period 2011-2013. In this sense it is an Irish strategy for addressing the 
crisis, not one imposed from outside. 
 
TABLE 1 Summary of Actual and Planned Austerity Measures over Period 2008-2015, €bn. 
  2008-2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2011-2015 
Revenue 5.6 1.4 1.6 1.3 1.1 0.7 6.1 
Expenditure 9.2 3.9 2.2 2.3 2.0 1.3 11.7 
of which Capital 1.6 1.9 0.8 0.6 0.1 0.0 3.3 
Total 14.7 5.3 3.8 3.5 3.1 2.0 17.7 
Per cent of GDP 9.2% 3.3% 2.3% 2.1% 1.8% 1.1% 10.6% 
 
Source:  Department of Finance Budgets. GDP figures revised based on CSO: National Income and Expenditure, 2011 and Duffy, et al., 2012. 
 
As shown in Table 1, roughly two-thirds of the actual and planned austerity package 
over the period 2011-15 relates to cuts in expenditure, both current and capital. In 
2009 and 2010 significant cuts in public sector pay levels19 were introduced, 
equivalent to up to 15 per cent of gross salary. There have also been very large cuts 
in expenditure on capital projects. On the revenue side, taxes on income have been 
raised substantially over the period 2009-11. In the next three years, 2013-2015, the 
planned consolidation measures total €8.6 billion, or 5 per cent of GDP. This means 
that approximately three quarters of the planned cuts over the period 2008-2015 of 
almost 20 per cent of GDP have already been implemented. 
 
TABLE 2 Official Target Deficit on General Government Balance (excluding banking transfers). 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
€ billion 14.7 13.1 12.4 8.1 5.0 
% of GDP 9.2 8.0 7.3 4.6 2.7 
Target deficit at end 2010:      
% of GDP 10.6 8.6 7.5 5.1 2.9 
 
Source:  Department of Finance Stability Programme Update. The figures for the GGB in € billion in that document have been expressed as a 
percentage of the rebased numbers for nominal GDP using the latest CSO National Income and Expenditure, 2011. 
 
Table 2 takes the revised target General Government Balance (GGB) in € billion, 
announced by the previous government, and updated by the incoming government 
in Budget 2012, and expresses it as a percentage of the latest estimates for GDP. 
These GDP figures have been revised to take account of the latest CSO National 
Income and Expenditure, 2011. Table 2 shows that the outturn for the GGB for 2011 
and the forecast outturn for 2012 are significantly ahead of the target set at the end 
of 2010. No account has been taken here of knock-on effects of the outperformance 
 
19  This includes the pension levy, which in national accounting terms is treated as a pay cut. 
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in 2012 on the deficit for later years. However, in Table 2 we have taken account of 
the upward revisions to the GDP figures by the CSO in the summer of 2012. 
Assuming that the fiscal effort remains as planned (defined in terms of € billion of 
cuts) and that there is no major change to the economic forecasts for 2013-15, this 
would suggest that a continued outperformance is possible. This leaves significant 
leeway to ensure that the deficit targets are met, even if there were a downward 
revision in GDP forecasts for the period 2013-15. 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, the plan drawn up in November 2010 by the 
Department of Finance and the outgoing government did not over-promise, which 
was a wise decision. By making very conservative assumptions on the response of 
the public finances to economic performance, they built in very considerable scope 
for outperformance. However, while the economic forecasts at the time looked 
conservative, as it has turned out they were not conservative enough because of the 
unexpected continuation of the crisis at an EU level. Thus, even with a more 
disappointing background economic performance, the public finances have 
continued to outperform the targets set in the 2010 plan. This is reassuring to the 
financial markets. 
 
A second aspect of the 2010 plan was that it did not promise to make the 
adjustment to the public finances more rapidly than was readily deliverable by the 
outgoing government or, even more important, by the incoming government. At the 
time, in autumn 2010, in order to minimise the long-term economic damage it might 
have been wise to make the fiscal adjustment more rapidly. However, if a more 
accelerated adjustment programme had been chosen and if it had proved 
undeliverable politically this would have served only to demoralise, damaging 
consumer and investor confidence. 
 
TABLE 3 Spanish Targets for Government Borrowing, % of GDP 
Stability Programme Update of: 2010 2011 2012 
2010 9.8 7.5 5.3 
2011  6.0 4.4 
2012 9.3 8.5 5.3 
 
Source: Spain, Stability Programme Updates. 
 
The relative success of this adjustment to date is highlighted by comparing the 
approach taken in Ireland with that taken in Spain. At the beginning of 2010 the then 
Spanish government, Spain, 2010, committed to cutting the GBB for Spain from 9.8 
per cent of GDP in 2010 to 7.5 per cent in 2011 and 5.3 per cent of GDP in 2012 
(Table 3). However, in April 2011 the then government revised this target for 2011 
down to 6 per cent of GDP and the target for 2012 down to 4.4 per cent of GDP. As it 
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has turned out, partly because of the renewed slump in the EU economy, the deficit 
for 2011 proved to be 8.5 per cent of GDP, not 6 per cent. In addition, the target for 
2012 has now had to be revised back up to 5.3 per cent of GDP, the same target that 
had originally been set in the Stability Programme Update in early 2010, Spain, 2011 
and Spain, 2012. 
 
The adjustment in the Spanish public finances planned in April 2011, Spain, 2011, 
was much more ambitious than was the case in Ireland. However, because of a 
failure to meet this more ambitious target, the financial markets have now lost faith 
in the ability of the new Spanish government to deliver and Spanish bond yields have 
risen above bond yields for Ireland. By contrast, in the case of Ireland, sure but 
steady progress has been rewarded.  
 
6 STRATEGY FOR FISCAL POLICY 2013-2015 
6.1 Budget 2013 
As argued above, the fiscal strategy for tackling the current crisis, which was put in 
place at the end of 2010, was broadly appropriate. The chosen adjustment path was 
predicated on an assessment of the prospective growth in the potential output of 
the economy. Having agreed an appropriate strategy, and having successfully 
implemented it over nearly two years, it should only be changed if new information 
appears suggesting that the potential output of the economy is significantly lower 
than previously understood (and hence the structural deficit is higher than 
expected). To date the tradable sector20 of the economy has behaved as one would 
expect – it has proved reasonably robust in the face of the huge shock to the rest of 
the economy21 – indicating that the potential output of the economy is robust.  
 
The overriding priority for fiscal policy next year will be to continue the process of 
restoring the public finances to sustainability. Because of the uncertainty inherent in 
any forecasts of the future it is important to try and frame policy on a "no regrets" 
basis: to ensure that whatever the outcome on economic growth, fiscal policy will 
not be inappropriate. As discussed above, with the current plan there was significant 
scope for outperformance. That means that, even if growth in the EU is 
disappointing next year, the target for the deficit may still be achievable. However, if 
the EU economy continues in recession, and if that were the reason that targets 
might not be met, a resulting higher than expected deficit would be attributable to 
cyclical factors, not a change in the structural deficit. Under these circumstances the 
fiscal stance should not be adjusted as the cyclical factors, of their nature, would 
 
20  The tradable sector includes manufacturing and a significant part of the market services sector that also exports 
extensively. 
21  FitzGerald, 2012b. 
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eventually be reversed. This is also the approach to policy taken by the IMF in their 
recent report on the Irish economy where they recommend sticking to the current 
adjustment plan, even if the targets were to be missed due to lower than expected 
EU growth, IMF, 2012.22 
 
While the public finances have outperformed the plan to date, there is still a long 
way to go before sustainability is guaranteed. Thus it is much too early to start 
"coasting" and ease off on the adjustments required in 2013-15. Hence the cuts 
planned for 2013 should be implemented in full in the coming Budget, as is required 
by the agreement with the Troika. (This would be the correct policy to follow even if 
there were no agreement with the Troika.) This will involve cuts or tax increases 
amounting to €3.5 billion ex ante next year. There will be some carryover from the 
decisions announced in the Budget for 2012 which will reduce, to a limited extent, 
the new measures to be taken next year. Nonetheless, achieving the full planned cut 
in expenditure next year of €2.3 billion will be very difficult. 
 
A rather different approach was proposed by the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council (IFAC, 
2011 and IFAC 2012). They argued for a much more rapid adjustment in the public 
finances. In particular they sought cuts for 2012 of €4.4 billion rather than the €3.8 
billion implemented in the Budget. They argued that such a change in policy was 
warranted because the government might not meet their target for the deficit, 
especially in 2012, and also because they felt that it was desirable to reduce the 
actual deficit more rapidly than planned to 1 per cent by 2015. 
 
The arguments concerning the likely outturn for 2012 centred on the unexpected 
weakness in economic activity, not a reassessment of the potential output of the 
economy. As argued above and in IMF, 2012, fiscal strategy should not be altered 
where targets are not met because of purely cyclical factors. In any event, as 
discussed above, in spite of the unfavourable external economic environment, it 
now seems likely that the deficit for 2012 will still come in ahead of target, Duffy, 
Durkan and Casey, 2012.23 
 
As discussed earlier, previous experience with fiscal adjustments suggested that 
there might have been advantages to targeting a more rapid adjustment than was 
eventually agreed in 2010. This is a view clearly shared by IFAC. However, having 
 
22  Outside the range of "normal" forecasts there is still the unlikely possibility that the euro area could collapse over the next 
eighteen months. Today this seems very unlikely, not least because of the very adverse consequences for all EMU 
members. If it did happen the consequences for Ireland would be very serious. However, there is no way of "insuring" 
against these very serious consequences through the choice of an appropriate use of fiscal policy. 
23  The assessment by IFAC may also have been affected by the very unsatisfactory nature of the statistics available, which 
has meant that the full reduction in borrowing last year has only become apparent in recent months. 
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adopted a workable plan and having implemented it successfully for two years, a lot 
of credibility has been built up with financial markets and with the people of Ireland. 
To signal a change in policy now could discredit the policy. The question could then 
be asked of the planned fiscal adjustment "if it is not broke why fix it?". In addition, 
when comparing the Irish adjustment with that in Spain, there is a lot to be said for 
setting politically achievable targets which will actually deliver the planned fiscal 
adjustment. Hence there are good reasons why the "bar" should not be raised today 
by planning for even tougher measures in 2013. 
 
In summary, having set out an appropriate medium-term fiscal plan, it is best to stick 
to it unless there is new information suggesting that the size of the structural deficit 
is substantially greater than previously estimated. This approach builds credibility 
with citizens and with financial markets. To date this has meant that the 
outperformance on the public finances has been reflected in lower deficits rather 
than in any modification in fiscal stance. However, should the effects of cyclical 
factors see the deficit exceed the target in a particular year, it would also be 
appropriate to leave the fiscal stance unchanged.  
 
6.2 Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy 
The medium-term fiscal plan involves further fiscal tightening in 2014 and in 2015. 
As with 2013, in the absence of any new information about the structural deficit, it is 
appropriate to stick to this plan. It is possible that by 2015 the structural deficit 
might still be significant but it is also possible that it could have disappeared by that 
date. As argued in Bergin et al., 2010b, much will depend on the timing of a return to 
growth in the EU economy. With reasonable EU growth in 2013, once the fiscal 
adjustment is largely completed, there is a likelihood that the Irish economy will also 
return to significant growth. Even if the response were somewhat less satisfactory, 
with a substantially delayed EU recovery, so that a small structural deficit (but a 
larger than planned actual deficit) remained in 2015, the task of eliminating it would 
be still be manageable. However, if events in the coming years suggest that the 
growth rate of potential output is much lower than that currently envisaged, then a 
further tightening in fiscal policy would be necessary. Until we get closer to the end 
date of the current adjustment (2015) and there is greater clarity about the potential 
output of the Irish economy (and hence the structural deficit) it is best to stick to the 
agreed package of cuts and tax increases. 
 
It is important for the future of the economy that the structural deficit is eliminated 
by the middle of the decade. This imperative stems from the needs of Irish people, 
not from an external rule (or fiscal treaty) – high rates of interest affect the trade off 
between current consumption and future consumption. Eliminating the structural 
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deficit by the middle of the decade will produce higher growth in the long run and 
will be welfare improving in the long run. 
Once the structural deficit has been eliminated, what should happen to fiscal policy? 
It will almost certainly be appropriate to run a surplus over the economic cycle post 
2015. However, as discussed earlier, it should be stressed that a surplus does not 
constitute a contractionary fiscal stance. It is the change in the structural surplus or 
deficit which affects the economy. Once the desired surplus is achieved, maintaining 
a structural surplus unchanged over time would not involve contractionary (or 
stimulatory) effects on the economy: it would be neutral in its economic effects, 
contrasting with the strong negative impulse coming from fiscal policy today. 
 
6.3 Reducing the Debt 
As well as eliminating current borrowing, an important task of fiscal policy will be to 
reduce the burden of debt to a safe level over a period of years. A lot of attention 
has focused elsewhere at EU level on this need to reduce the indebtedness of states. 
This is undoubtedly important to ensure that states will in future be in a position to 
deal with new shocks. In the case of Ireland there is also the issue that, while it faces 
favourable demographics out to 2025 or 2030, it would be appropriate to rebuild a 
buffer of assets (reduce debt) to insulate against the economic costs of ageing post 
2030.  
 
The traditional approach taken by the EU and the IMF to the issue of debt reduction 
suggests that Ireland run a substantial surplus over the period to 2030 to get the 
debt/GDP ratio back down to 60% by that date. The objective of debt reduction is 
correct but much of this discussion on debt reduction has ignored the most 
appropriate and least costly way to bring about a substantial once off reduction in 
Ireland's indebtedness. This would involve returning the nationalised banks to 
profitability and eventually selling them off later this decade to recoup a substantial 
part of the state's forced investment in them. 
 
As of July 2011, according to the stress tests, the book value of the not-so-bad 
banks24 was around 20% of GDP. Nonetheless, if sold today they would not find a 
buyer and the valuation of the state's investment in the banks by the National 
Pension Reserve Fund is very low. This reflects the continuing uncertainty about the 
future of the economy and of the banks themselves. A key objective for the 
government must be to first return the economy to growth and then to return the 
banks it owns (or part owns) to profitability. Later in the decade these profitable 
banks should be sold. This could achieve a once off major reduction in the debt/GDP 
level. 
 
24  AIB, Irish Life and Permanent and the Bank of Ireland. 
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The big danger to such a favourable outcome is, firstly, that the EU and Irish 
economies do not return to growth within a reasonable time scale. However, if 
growth is restored then the second policy danger is that the state, as shareholder, 
could fritter away its investment in these banks by forgiving debt that would 
otherwise be repaid, or selling assets at fire-sale prices. Such a mistake could be very 
costly for the people of Ireland and it would also necessitate running a significantly 
larger government surplus over the longer term than would otherwise be necessary.  
 
A simple way of ensuring value for money from the surviving banks (excluding the 
IBRC) would be to swop the government's equity in the banks, valued as at July 2011, 
with the EU ESM, in return for debt. This would involve no further payment by the 
ESM to Ireland – it would merely swop debt owed by Ireland for equity (shares in 
Irish banks) currently owned by the government. Such a deal would ensure that the 
debt/GDP ratio fell dramatically at an early date, further facilitating the return to 
sustainability. The ESM would also have a stronger and clearer incentive to ensure 
that the banks are returned to profitability than does the Irish government. In the 
ownership of the EU (through the ESM) the banks could prove to be a more valuable 
long-term asset than if left in Irish hands. 
 
As a result of developments at the European Council in June 2012 such a solution, 
which might previously have been unthinkable, is now being seriously discussed. 
Hopefully these discussions will reach a successful conclusion before the end of the 
year. However, a successful outcome must await a similar deal being implemented 
for Spain.  
 
The reason for awaiting a Spanish deal is that such an agreement could involve all 
the capital needs of the Spanish banks being met by new EU investment. A 
significant part of such an investment in Spanish banks would be designed to cover 
as yet unrealised losses in those banks. In the case of Ireland much of these losses 
have already been realised and this is reflected in the reduced valuation of the banks 
today. If Ireland was negotiating on its own, it might be difficult to make the case for 
such an approach to valuing the Irish banks (at their 2011 value). However, were 
such a deal to be negotiated for Spain, there would be strong equity reasons for 
applying a symmetric approach to Irish banks, even though Ireland is much further 
down the road to restoring its banks to normal operations. In any event, once the 
Irish banks were restored to running order, with an economic recovery the EU would 
have a good chance of recovering all of its investment. From an EU point of view the 
downside to such a deal would be the risk of a failure to return the EU economy to 
normal running order within a reasonable time scale, resulting in both the Irish 
economy and the value of its banks underperforming in the future. However, the EU 
itself is best placed to take policy action to avoid such an outcome. 
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6.4 Fiscal Policy – the Details 
So far the focus of this paper has been on the overall stance of fiscal policy, not its 
composition. However, there is extensive evidence to guide us on how best to make 
the necessary cuts in expenditure and increases in taxation. Some of this evidence is 
provided by papers at this Budget Perspectives Conference, as well as at previous 
Conferences. In choosing the appropriate mix of instruments the priority for policy 
should be to maximise the future growth in employment. Reversing the dramatic rise 
in unemployment is clearly a primary goal for policy, with both economic and social 
benefits.  
 
 
 
Conefrey et al., 2012, provide a ranking of taxes in terms of their impact on 
employment. The results of this research are consistent with the conclusions of the 
Commission on Taxation, 2009. This research suggests that a tax on property would 
have less damaging effects on employment than carbon taxes (followed by other 
indirect taxes). Taxes on labour – income tax and social contributions – are likely to 
have the most negative impact on employment.  
 
 
 
This suggests the importance of implementing a significant tax on property. Callan et 
al., 2010 and Keane et al. 2012, show how a property tax can be designed to meet a 
range of objectives, including distributional objectives. Even with some links to 
ability to pay, a property tax would have little impact on marginal tax rates in 
employment and would have a minimum negative impact on employment. 
 
 
 
Water charges, if implemented as part of the development of a new efficient water 
service, are also likely to bring efficiency gains, offsetting some of the negative 
effects of their cost for households, FitzGerald and Morgenroth, 2012. What will be 
important will be to structure the new utility to ensure that these efficiency gains 
are realised in practise. 
 
 
 
Callan et al., 2009a and 2009b, have considered a range of other issues. In particular, 
there appear to be significant advantages to bringing child benefit payments within 
the tax system. This would have a less negative impact on employment than would 
increases in other direct taxes; it would also have favourable distributional effects 
and could be implemented in a way that reduced potential poverty traps. The extent 
and causes of "unemployment traps" is examined in detail in another paper to this 
conference, Callan et al., 2012. 
 
 
 
Significant cuts in current expenditure for future years are already announced. 
Reductions in the cost of providing services would have a less damaging effect than 
cuts in the services themselves. It remains to be seen whether "Croke Park" and any 
successor will deliver the necessary further reductions in the cost of public services. 
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ABSTRACT 
The UK Government is currently preparing to implement a major reform to the 
welfare system by integrating (and simplifying) means-tested welfare benefits and 
in-work tax credits for working-age adults into a single programme, to be known as 
Universal Credit, and to be phased in from October 2013. The primary motivation is 
not to save money (although many other changes to welfare benefits have been 
announced since May 2010 which will save the government money). Instead, the 
aims are to make it easier for claimants to claim benefits, make the gains to work 
more transparent, and reduce the amount spent on administration and lost in fraud 
and error. The reform will increase entitlements to welfare payments in a way 
which, on average, helps low-income (working) families more than middle-income 
families, especially for couple families. But many details remain unclear, including 
how Universal Credit will interact with the new, localised Council Tax Rebate system, 
how tough the conditionality regime will be, particularly for working families, and 
whether Universal Credit can be made to respond automatically to claimants' 
earnings in real-time. 
  
 
1  Corresponding author: mbrewer@essex.ac.uk. This research was supported by the ESRC Centre for the Microeconomic 
Analysis of Public Policy at the Institute for Fiscal Studies (Browne, Jin) and the ESRC Research Centre on Micro-social 
Change at the Institute for Social and Economic Research (Brewer). The Family Resources Survey was collected by the 
Department for Work and Pensions and made available through the Economic and Social Data Service (ESDS), which bears 
no responsibility for the interpretation of the data in this Briefing Note. Crown copyright material is reproduced with the 
permission of the Controller of HMSO and the Queen's Printer for Scotland. This paper draws on, and, in parts, repeats, 
the authors' previous analysis, published in Brewer et al., (2011, 2012); but the empirical analysis in this version reflects 
the current thinking on Universal Credit and so may differ from earlier versions.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The UK Government is currently preparing to implement a major reform to the 
welfare and tax credit system by integrating means-tested welfare benefits and in-
work tax credits for working-age adults into a single programme, to be known as 
Universal Credit. This paper reviews the arguments for its introduction, and updates 
or summarises previous work that uses microsimulation methods to examine the 
way that this reform will affect families' benefit entitlements and individuals' 
financial work incentives.  
 
This analysis should be seen as preliminary for a number of reasons. First, full details 
of how entitlements to Universal Credit will be set were not available at the time of 
writing (August 2012). The most significant of these is that it is not yet clear how the 
localised Council Tax Rebate will interact with Universal Credit (and so, as we explain 
later, the microsimulation work analyses a world without Council Tax Rebate).2 
Second, Universal Credit is likely to have complicated impacts on benefit take-up and 
labour supply behaviour which we have abstracted from here; these are likely to 
result not only from the changes to financial work incentives we describe in this 
paper but also the conditionality regime for Universal Credit, which will be different 
from, and in general tougher than, that which currently applies.  
 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the current system 
of means-tested benefits and tax credits in the UK, and the stated rationale for 
Universal Credit. Section 3 explains some of the key issues the Government had to 
confront having decided to integrate several benefits and tax credits, and outlines 
how entitlements to Universal Credit will be set, comparing this with the current set 
of means-tested benefits and tax credits. Section 4 gives a quantitative assessment 
of the impact of Universal Credit on household incomes and on measures of financial 
work incentives. Section 5 summarises and concludes. We note that the current 
(since May 2010) coalition UK government has announced many other changes to 
the benefit and tax credit system, which together will reduce welfare spending by 
£18 billion/year by 2014-15, but in this paper, we take those other changes as given: 
our analysis assesses the impact of the Universal Credit reform alone, rather than 
the overall changes to benefit entitlements and work incentives as will be 
experienced by families and individuals over the next few years; Brewer, Browne and 
Joyce (2011) forecast measures of income poverty in the UK through to 2020, 
including the impact of all welfare changes. 
  
 
2  See Adam and Browne, 2012, for extensive analysis of the decision to localise council tax rebate. 
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2  UNIVERSAL CREDIT: WHY IS IT NEEDED? AND FROM WHERE DID THE IDEA COME 
 FROM? 
 
 
In November 2010, the UK government set out plans to integrate and simplify all 
means-tested welfare benefits and in-work tax credits into a single programme, to 
be known as Universal Credit and to be phased in from October 2013.3 The 
government hopes that this will make it easier for claimants to claim benefits, make 
the gains to work more transparent, and reduce the amount spent on administration 
and lost in fraud and error. 
 
To understand how the reform works, and why it was thought necessary, one needs 
to understand a little about the current system of means-tested social security 
benefits for working-age adults in the UK. One way to characterise this is that the UK 
has: 
• separate, mutually-exclusive benefits providing income replacement to non-
working families, or income top-ups to working families4, and 
• separate but not mutually-exclusive means-tested benefits providing help with a 
family's extra costs; these can overlap both with each other and the income-
replacement benefits.5 
 
This is illustrated for a specimen family in Figure 2.1.  
 
The current UK government argues that this leads to the following faults: 
• Having separate, mutually-exclusive income-replacement benefits for families 
who are not in work is inefficient (for claimants and the government).  
• Having separate benefits for those who are working fewer than 16 hours and for 
those who are working 16 or more hours adds an unwelcome barrier to those 
trying to move from not-in-work (or from "welfare") to work, and this 
particularly affects those with volatile working patterns. 
  
 
3  The original announcement was Department for Work and Pensions (2010a), with the thinking developed in Department 
for Work and Pensions (2010b).  
4  There are: Jobseeker's Allowance (JSA), intended for unemployed people, Employment and Support Allowance (ESA), 
intended for those too ill or disabled to work at the present; Income Support (IS), intended for other people, mostly lone 
parents with young children, who are not working and not expected to look for work; Working Tax Credit (WTC), intended 
for people who are in work but have a low family income. 
5  These are Child Tax Credit, Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit. 
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FIGURE 2.1 Current System of Welfare Entitlements for an Example Family 
 
 
Note:  The entitlements are based on an assumed couple with two children. Only one person in the couple is in work, and they can choose 
how many hours to work at a given wage rate, £6.50 per hour. The family has no disabled members and no unearned income. Their 
Local Housing Allowance (LHA) or eligible rent is £80/wk, and their council tax liability is £24 a week. 
 
• Having overlapping benefits (i.e. instances where families are receiving more 
than one means-tested benefit) can be confusing for claimants, particularly 
when the rules for determining entitlements mean that the benefits interact.6 
Such interactions make the overall impact of the means-tested benefit system 
opaque, and create opportunities for claimants to be inconvenienced by delays 
in official bodies calculating entitlements.  
• The inefficiency (for government) and confusion (for claimants) that arises by 
having overlapping benefits is particularly acute when they are administered by 
different authorities. In the UK, the Department for Work and Pensions 
administers JSA, ESA and IS, the revenue department (HM Revenue and 
Customs) administers tax credits, and local authorities administer HB and CTB; 
this means that claimants need to report their circumstances to more than one 
organisation (it also means that claimants could strategically report different 
information to different organisations). 
 
These criticisms are, of course, not all new, but benefit integration seems not to 
have been a priority of the previous government. Some of the (many) changes 
between 1997 and 2010 did achieve some form of integration. For example, in 2003, 
the child tax credit brought together (and replaced) child-contingent support 
previously provided through add-ons to income-replacement and income top-up 
 
6  For example, entitlements to WTC currently depend in part upon a family's earnings, and entitlement to HB depends in 
part not only on a family's earnings but also directly on its entitlement to WTC; this complexity and confusion is 
compounded by the fact that entitlements to WTC and HB each depend upon a different measure of earnings. 
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benefits and a non-refundable tax credit: this, therefore, integrated the child-related 
components of different benefits, rather than integrating entire benefits. And in 
2008, a single benefit (called Employment and Support Allowance, or ESA) was 
created designed for people who wished to claim an income-replacement benefit 
because they were too sick or disabled to work; before ESA, such people would 
receive one or more of two benefits depending on whether they had made sufficient 
past social insurance contributions. And the government did consider the idea of a 
comprehensive benefit integration: a Green Paper in 2006 came out in favour of a 
single working-age benefit, stating: 
"We consider that there may be advantages in moving in the longer term towards a 
single system of benefits for all people of working age, with appropriate additions for 
those who have caring responsibilities and those with a long-term illness or 
disability." 
 
And: 
"The next step is to review the range of benefits to identify the challenges to 
creating a single system with fair and effective solutions."7 
 
A year later, perhaps after identifying the challenges, it concluded that:  
"developing a single, coherent system of benefits would take time – changes could 
be very disruptive if introduced in one go," 
and that: 
"a single system [i.e. an integrated benefit system] should be seen not as a fixed 
blueprint, but as a model which, along with our reform principles, informs the nature 
and direction of changes to the benefits system." 8 
 
Another year later, its ambitions had been both scaled down and slowed down:  
"We want to explore whether, over the long-term, [a simpler system] can be 
achieved in a single benefit drawing on the best features of JSA, IS and the new 
ESA."9 
 
We conclude that benefit integration was not an urgent policy priority for the 
previous government. If there was any consideration, then it was about a limited 
reform: the previous government expressed no desire to combine, say, ESA with JSA 
and IS, nor to integrate any of those with HB and CTB, or the tax credits. Indeed, one 
could go further and argue that the previous government's decision in 2001 to align 
its new tax credit system with the income tax system rather than the welfare system 
is an important reason why the current system feels so non-integrated and complex. 
Arguably, the main motivation behind that decision was to reduce the stigma 
 
7  Both from chapter 7 of DWP (2006).  
8 All from chapter 7 of DWP (2007). 
9  Para 6.8 of DWP (2008). 
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associated with receiving cash transfers. It will be interesting to see whether the 
decision to have Universal Credit administered by the Department for Work and 
Pensions, and have it feel like a regular social security benefit, does anything to 
increase stigma. 
 
Proposals to integrate benefits had been made by organisations outside 
government.10 In particular, Sainsbury and Stanley (2007) proposed integrating the 
out-of-work income-replacement benefits described above into a single benefit, but 
with the extra benefits and working tax credit continuing to exist alongside. Some 
work exploring the attractions of such a model was even commissioned by the 
government of the time: see Sainsbury and Weston (2010). The attractions of such a 
reform were also noted by David Freud, then an adviser to the Labour government 
and now a Conservative peer and Minister for welfare reform in the current 
government. However, Freud (2007) considered integrated benefits which were 
much simpler than Universal Credit. But the main inspiration for the current 
Government's plan to integrate benefits, though, comes from a report produced by a 
think-tank called the Centre for Social Justice (see Centre for Social Justice, 2009): 
the Secretary of State now in charge of introducing Universal Credit, Iain Duncan 
Smith, was previously chairman of the CSJ, and the lead author of the report 
(Stephen Brien) became a paid adviser to the current UK government to help 
introduce Universal Credit. Some of the arguments made in Brien's report in turn 
drew upon those in Brewer, Saez and Shephard (2010), who in 2008, had sketched 
out a model for integrating all means-tested benefits and tax credits, and also for 
altering the way in which support was withdrawn as incomes rose to improve, 
hopefully, the implied pattern of financial work incentives.  
 
3  UNIVERSAL CREDIT: HOW WILL IT WORK?  
3.1 Overview of the Key Features of Universal Credit11 
The Government plans that Universal Credit will replace most means-tested welfare 
benefits and in-work tax credits designed for working-age adults. As already noted, 
the key exception is Council Tax Rebate (previous Council Tax Benefit, or CTB), which 
is being kept outside Universal Credit, and being devolved to local authorities to 
design and operate. The UK's main non-means-tested benefits will not be 
superseded by Universal Credit, and means-tested support for families where all 
adults are over the female state pension age (rising from 60 to 65 over this decade) 
is not directly affected by the reform.   
 
10  This short history is taken in part from Bennett and Sutherland (2011). 
11  The best single source at the time of writing on how Universal Credit might work is CPAG (2012). The text of the relevant 
Bill can be found at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2010-2012/0197/cbill_2010-
20120197_en_1.htm, and the DWP have put a series of policy notes and explanatory memoranda here 
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/policy/welfare-reform/legislation-and-key-documents/welfare-reform-act-2012/welfare-reform-
draft-regulations/. 
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Universal Credit will be administered by the Department for Work and Pensions 
(DWP), in contrast to the current system where HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) 
manages tax credits and DWP administers most means-tested benefits. It will be 
paid monthly as a single payment; this represents a significant change from the 
existing system, under which some benefits are paid fortnightly, and under which 
benefits and tax credits designed for children are paid to the main carer in a couple. 
 
An important aspect of Universal Credit, which we largely ignore in our quantitative 
analysis, will be the conditionality regime. The government has said, in effect, that 
families who report low earnings, and which contain an adult who it considers is 
capable of working (or working longer hours), will be subject to conditionality. 
Although it is not clear how this will operate, presumably these families will be 
obliged to look for (longer hours) work, perhaps backed up with sanctions as in the 
current regime for JSA. It looks like the eventual system will extend some form of 
conditionality to more families than are currently affected. For example, under 
Universal Credit couples without responsibilities for young children will have to 
report joint earnings equivalent to two full-time minimum wage workers to escape 
any conditionality; under the current regime, such families could not be subject to 
conditionality provided one person worked 24 hours (if they had children) or 30 
hours a week (if they did not have children). 
 
Maximum Entitlements 
Universal Credit will resemble a negative income tax administered at the family level, 
with entitlements depending on family circumstances and family resources, and no 
explicit dependence on whether a claimant family is in work or not. Each family who 
claims will be entitled to a personal amount with additional amounts for children 
and those with disabilities, and those in rented accommodation will receive an 
additional amount (to reflect their housing costs).12 The government has said that it 
will set these additional elements in a way that means that most out-of-work welfare 
claimants with no other sources of income or savings will see their entitlements to 
benefits unaffected by the move to Universal Credit. This means that the personal 
amount will be higher for couples than for single people (though not twice as high), 
and lower for some young people. The housing component will be similar to HB, and 
the amounts for child additions will be based on the current rates of CTC. However, 
there will be changes to maximum benefit entitlements for some families. Some of 
these will arise because the government intends to simplify disability premiums 
when Universal Credit is introduced in a way that will be approximately revenue 
neutral overall, but will create winners and losers among those with disabilities. But 
there will also be substantial changes to (usually reductions in) welfare entitlements 
 
12  There will remain a form support for those with mortgages, but it is only available for those with no earnings at all, and 
only after a waiting period of 6 months and its receipt is normally limited to a maximum of two years.  
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among couples where one person is above and one below the female pension age 
(which is rising from 60 to 65 over this decade): such families can currently claim the 
generous pension credit, but will in future have to claim Universal Credit, where the 
adult aged below the pension age could in principle be subject to conditionality if he 
or she were not in work. 
 
Treatment of Income 
Under Universal Credit, earned income will be subject to a taper rate of 65%, but this 
taper will apply to earned income having deducted income tax and National 
Insurance (social security) contributions (NICs). This means that the effective 
withdrawal rate will depend upon the tax and NIC rate faced. For example, an 
individual earning less than the income tax threshold who earns an additional pound 
will pay no more tax or NIC and lose 65p of Universal Credit, but an individual liable 
for National Insurance and paying income tax at the main rate of 20% who earns an 
additional pound will have to pay an additional 20p in income tax and 12p in NICs 
and will then lose 65% of the remaining 68p of additional net earnings (which comes 
to 44.2p) in Universal Credit, making a total marginal effective tax rate (METR) of just 
over 76%. (However, if the reformed CTB is withdrawn over the same range of 
income as Universal Credit, it is likely that METRs could be in excess of 80% for some 
individuals receiving Universal Credit). Characterising METRs under the current 
system is much more difficult (as the system has non-integrated overlapping tapers), 
but can rise to over 90% for those receiving multiple benefits or tax credits.  
 
There will be an earnings disregard that depends on family circumstances.13 The 
disregards will be reduced for families claiming help with rental costs, but subject to 
a floor; having lower earnings disregards for those receiving help with rental costs 
prevents Universal Credit entitlements from extending too high up the earnings 
distribution (this is achieved under the current system by having a higher effective 
withdrawal rate for those receiving help with rental costs through HB).  
 
Most unearned income other than interest income (which has a special treatment, 
see below) will not be subject to a disregard at all, and will reduce entitlement to 
Universal Credit pound-for-pound. This is mostly identical to the current treatment 
of such income under the means-tested welfare benefits, but it is a stricter means-
test than under tax credits where unearned income is currently subject to, at most, a 
41% taper. As a result, current claimants of tax credits who rely on unearned income 
 
13 These earnings disregards turn out to be important parameters in Universal Credit. Since the government has said it will 
set the basic entitlement to Universal Credit at levels that match entitlement to the current set of out-of-work benefits, 
and that there will be only one withdrawal rate for earnings in Universal Credit across all family types and all ranges of 
earnings, it follows that the only way in which the government can vary in-work incomes across different family types is 
through the earnings disregards. 
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(e.g. out-of-work lone parents receiving large amounts of maintenance payments for 
themselves) can potentially lose considerably from the Universal Credit reform. 
 
Furthermore, special rules will apply to those with savings or investment income: 
instead of taking into account the actual amount of investment income, a claimant's 
savings will be used to calculate an imputed income.14 Savings of less than £6,000 
will be ignored, and if savings exceed £16,000, then a family will lose all entitlement 
to Universal Credit. This treatment of investment income is also identical to the way 
that means-tested benefits (IS, income-based JSA and ESA, HB and CTB) currently 
operate, but it is much more harsh than the current treatment of such income in tax 
credits, where investment income below £300 per year is ignored altogether, and 
investment income above £300 per year, as well as all other unearned income, is 
subject to, at most, a 41% taper.  
 
3.2 Impact on Specimen Families 
As described in Section 2, the current set of benefits and tax credits are not 
integrated, or even all aligned with each other. Moving from a system of 
independent, unaligned benefits and tax credits to a sensible integrated system is 
impossible without creating winners or losers.15 Before we move on to show how 
Universal Credit affects incomes on average, we show here the impact on some 
specimen families.16  
 
Figure 3.1 shows the budget constraint for a low-waged single adult aged over 25.  
• Such a person will be better off (or unaffected) under Universal Credit if he 
works for less than 30 hours a week, because the withdrawal rate in Universal 
Credit will be lower than those in the current out-of-work means-tested 
benefits.  
• They will be worse off under Universal Credit if they work between 30 and 39 
hours a week. 
 
14  For savings between £6,000 and £16,000, an income of £1 a week will be imputed for every £250 of savings in excess of 
£6,000 (i.e. savings of £7,000 will lead to an imputed income of £4 per week). 
15  Some of the examples of the lack of integration or alignment are as follows: 
 • The relationship between the claimant's age, family type and maximum entitlement is different for the benefit  
  system and the tax credit system 
 • The definitions of earned income is different in the benefit system and the tax credit system 
 • The treatment of financial capital differs within the benefit system, and between the benefit system and the tax  
  credit system 
 • The number of hours a week that need to be worked to be entitled to in-work benefits varies between family  
  types within the tax credit system 
 • The combined marginal effective tax rate faced by recipients of benefits or tax credits depends upon the   
  combination of benefits and tax credits to which they are entitled. 
 Many of the reasons that particular families win or lose under Universal Credit can be traced back to the way the 
government is resolving these inconsistencies. 
16  All of the figures ignore council tax, council tax rebate, and its (currently uncertain) replacement.  
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• They will be unaffected by the reform if they work for more than 39 hours a 
week (as their earnings will be too high for them to receive benefit payments in 
either system).  
 
The "crossing point" at 30 hours work a week exists mostly because the current 
system gives rise to a sharp increase in benefit entitlement when weekly working 
hours reaches 30, the minimum needed to be eligible for Working Tax Credit for 
those without children.17  
 
FIGURE 3.1 Budget Constraint under Universal Credit for an Example Single Adult  
 
 
Notes:  Based on an assumed single adult: he can choose how many hours to work at a given wage rate, £6.50 per hour; and he has no 
disability and no unearned income.  
 
Figure 3.2 shows the budget constraint for a lone parent with two children. The 
figure illustrates how Universal Credit removes many of the kinks in the existing 
system that result from the hours rules in WTC, the interaction between different 
benefits and the simultaneous withdrawal of benefits. As a result, the net impact of 
the reform varies by hours worked in a complicated way but, in general: 
• If the lone parent works for less than 16 hours a week, they will be better off 
under Universal Credit than under the current system. This is mainly a result of 
the substantial earnings disregard in Universal Credit, at about £150 per week. In 
 
17 The figure suggests that Universal Credit may weaken the incentive for single adults with low potential wages to do full-
time work, but the government has also announced that single people without children will be subject to conditionality 
until they are earning 35 times the minimum wage each week. See Department of Work and Pensions (2011a). 
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contrast, in the current system, they would faces a 100% marginal effective tax 
rate if they worked for less than 16 hours a week, after a £20 a week disregard.  
• If the lone parent works for between 16 and 29 hours a week (and thus be 
entitled to WTC under the current system), the differences between 
entitlements in the two systems is small. 
• If the lone parent works for 30 or more hours a week, they will be slightly worse 
off under Universal Credit as the maximum entitlement to tax credits in the 
current system exceeds their entitlement to Universal Credit at these levels of 
earnings. Furthermore, the combination of withdrawal of Universal Credit, 
income tax and NICs gives rise to a marginal effective tax rate of 76.2%, which is 
higher than the combined rate of 73% in the current system, and so the losses 
for this lone parent increase the more hours they work above 30 hours per 
week.18 
 
FIGURE 3.2 Budget Constraint under Universal Credit for an Example Lone Parent with Two Children 
 
 
Notes:  Based on an assumed lone parent with two children who can choose how many hours to work at a given wage rate, £6.50 per hour, 
and has no housing costs, no disability and no unearned income.  
 
Figure 3.3 shows the budget constraint for an adult in a couple with two children. 
For any positive number of working hours, the family will be better off under 
Universal Credit than under the current system. These gains are attributable to the 
lower withdrawal rate of Universal Credit compared with the combined withdrawal 
rate of WTC and Housing Benefit in the current system. The Universal Credit system 
will create a marginal effective tax rate that is either 65% or 76.2% for most working 
 
18  We have assumed that the lone parent is not using formal childcare, but this does not affect the analysis materially as the 
effective subsidy for childcare under UC will be unchanged from the one under tax credits, but slightly less generous than 
that which applied to families receiving HB or CTB. See Department for Work and Pensions (2011b).  
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hours; the current system, though, involves a 100% rate as Income Support is 
withdrawn at low hours, and an approximately 90% rate due to the combination of 
WTC and HB withdrawal at higher levels of hours worked. The gap between the two 
budget constraints translates to significant differences in incentives to engage in 
paid work. 
 
FIGURE 3.3 Budget Constraint under Universal Credit for an Example Couple with Two Children  
 
 
Notes:  Based on an assumed couple with two children: one partner can choose how many hours to work at a given wage rate, £10 per hour; 
the other is out of work; their LHA is £100 per week; and they have no disability and no unearned income. 
 
Figure 3.4 shows the budget constraint for the second earner in a couple. If the 
second earner works no more than about 10 hours a week, the family will be better 
off under Universal Credit than under the current system (for similar reasons to 
those outlined in the previous example): such a family's entitlement to Universal 
Credit will be higher than its entitlement to Working Tax Credit under the current 
system. As the second earner's working hours rise, the higher maximum entitlement 
to Universal Credit will be outweighed by its higher withdrawal rate (for jobs of 
between 1 to 14 hours a week, the marginal effective tax rate is 65% under Universal 
Credit, and 41% under the current system). Overall, the second earner's financial 
incentive to work is generally weaker under Universal Credit both because single 
earner couples are treated more favourably by Universal Credit than the current 
system, but also because the withdrawal rate in Universal Credit affecting second 
earners is higher than its equivalent in the current system.  
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FIGURE 3.4 Budget Constraint under Universal Credit for an Example Couple without Children 
 
 
Notes:  Based on an assumed couple without children: one partner can choose how many hours to work at a given wage rate, £6.50 per 
hour; the other works 35 hours a week at £7 per hour; their LHA is £80 per week; and they have no disability and no unearned 
 income. 
 
 
 
4  WINNERS AND LOSERS AND THE COST TO GOVERNMENT IN THE LONG RUN 
In this section, we present an overview of a microsimulation analysis of which 
working-age families gain and lose from the introduction of Universal Credit.19 We 
do this by imagining that it is implemented in full in 2014–15, and we compare that 
to a hypothetical 2014-15 benefit system where Universal Credit was not 
introduced.20 Therefore, when we describe a certain type of family as winning 
(losing) from the reform, what we mean precisely is that this type of family would be 
entitled to more (less) benefits under Universal Credit in 2014-15 than it would have 
had it faced a hypothetical 2014-15 benefit system where Universal Credit was not 
introduced.21 All of the analysis ignores council tax, council tax rebate, and its 
 
19  "Working-age families" include all families where everyone is below 60, and couples (with or without children) where one 
is below 60 and one is 60 or above. We omit families where all adults are above the female state pension age as they are 
not intended to be affected by the Universal Credit reform. 
20  We use the TAXBEN model based at the Institute for Fiscal Studies. The most recent, albeit dated, description of how 
TAXBEN works is Giles and McCrae (1995); most of its key features have remained unchanged since then. In what follows, 
we compare our estimate of what the tax and benefit system would look like in 2014–15 were Universal Credit not 
introduced, taking into account all announcements made in or before the 2011 Budget, and our estimate of the tax and 
benefit system in 2014–15 with Universal Credit in place. All cash amounts are expressed in 2014–15 prices. In a 
companion piece, Brewer, Browne and Joyce (2011) have forecast measures of income poverty through to 2020, including 
the impact of Universal Credit, and accounting as best they can for the phase-in and transitional protection of Universal 
Credit. The analysis here updates that in Brewer et al (2012) to reflect (small) policy announcements since then; we have 
also broadened the scope of the analysis to include all families which contain one adult aged under 60. 
21  The government has promised that no existing claimant will lose in cash terms when the Universal Credit comes in if their 
circumstances do not change. However, the transitional protection will not apply to new claimants, nor will it apply if a 
family experiences a change in circumstances (which has not yet been precisely defined). Furthermore, over time, the real 
value of the cash-term protection will fall due to inflation. We therefore ignore the transitional protection; this means our 
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(currently uncertain) replacement; this means we will under-estimate some families' 
in-work incomes, and underestimate some individuals' PTRs and METRs. 
 
Overall, 2.9 million working-age families will gain from the introduction of Universal 
Credit, and 1.8 million will lose out (in the absence of transitional protection). 2.4 
million families entitled to means-tested benefits or tax credits will see no change in 
their disposable income because their entitlements to Universal Credit will match 
their current entitlements to means-tested benefits and tax credits. A further 13.6 
million working-age families will not be affected by the reform because their 
incomes are too high to qualify for any means-tested transfer payments in either 
system. 
 
On average, working-age families that stand to gain will see a 9.1% increase in their 
disposable income, which amounts to an average £32.70 per week in 2014–15 prices 
for each family. The average family that loses will be worse off by 10.1% (or £40.15 
per week). Overall, Universal Credit will lead to a 0.18% average increase (i.e. £0.98 
per week) in income across all working-age families. Under our assumptions, the 
new system of Universal Credit will be more expensive than the existing regime by 
£1.2 billion per year.22  
 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the proportions of winners and losers in the long run from the 
reform by decile group of the income distribution in Great Britain. In each of the 
bottom five income decile groups, there are more winners than losers, though there 
are substantial numbers of losers as well as winners. Many in the richer half of the 
distribution are unlikely to be affected because they do not receive any means-
tested benefits or tax credits under the current regime; when they are affected, they 
are more likely to lose than gain. A substantial proportion of current welfare 
recipients in the bottom three deciles are not affected, because maximum 
entitlements to Universal Credit are based on maximum entitlements to the current 
system of means-tested benefits for workless families. 
 
As a fraction of income, Universal Credit will benefit poorer families more than richer 
ones in the long run (see Figure 4.2). The poorest 10% of working-age families will 
see a 4.7% increase in their income, on average, a rise which declines to 0.2% in the 
 
analysis could be thought of as the "long-run impact" of the reform (but assuming full take-up and no behavioural 
responses). 
22  Note that this assumes full take-up in both the existing and Universal Credit systems, and therefore does not include the 
cost of any increase in take-up arising from Universal Credit. The government estimates that expenditure on benefits will 
increase by £4 billion a year as a result of both higher entitlements to Universal Credit and higher take-up of Universal 
Credit but in the long run there will be savings of £2 billion a year as a result of reduced fraud, error and overpayments. 
The government's estimate of overall long-run cost of introducing Universal Credit is therefore £2 billion a year. See 
Department of Work and Pensions (2011c). 
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fifth decile group; the richer half of the population will see small losses on average 
(mostly arising from families losing entitlement to child tax credit).  
 
FIGURE 4.1 Winners and losers by income decile group, without transitional protection 
 
 
Notes:  Assumes full take-up and ignores behavioural response. Income decile groups are based on equivalised family income using the 
McClements equivalence scale. 
Source: Authors' calculations using the IFS tax and benefit microsimulation model, TAXBEN, run on uprated data from the 2009–10 Family 
Resources Survey.  
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FIGURE 4.2 Average Impact on Disposable Income by Income Decile Group 
 
 
Notes:  As for Figure 4.1. 
Source:  As for Figure 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.3 illustrates the changes in disposable income in both cash and percentage 
terms, averaged across all families for each type. Single adults will gain little on 
average: since (as shown in Figure 4.1) a small proportion of them will gain and a 
similar proportion will lose. Couples without children are also very unlikely to be 
affected with slightly more winners than losers (as shown in Figure 4.1), and the 
average impact on them will be a small gain. Couples with children will gain the 
most, on average, gaining an average of £5.40 per week (0.6% of their income). The 
average long-run impact on lone parents will be close to zero, at -£0.10. Finally, the 
average change for couples with one aged 60 or above is a substantial loss, at 
-£15.07 (-2.1% of their income); as described in Section 2, some of these couples lose 
substantially through having to claim Universal Credit rather than Pension Credit. 
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FIGURE 4.3 Average Impact on Disposable Income by Family Type 
 
 
Notes: As for Figure 4.1. 
Source:  As for Figure 4.1. 
 
A more detailed analysis shows that, although the government has said that it will 
set maximum entitlements to Universal Credit to mirror the current set of welfare 
benefits, it is the case that some workless families will experience relatively 
substantial losses. This is mostly attributable to two factors. First, many workless 
families have unearned income, such as maintenance payments from former 
partners (particularly important for lone parents), and income from savings, 
investments and private pensions (which are common among those taking early 
retirement); as described in Section 3, most of these unearned income sources will 
be treated more harshly under Universal Credit than currently under tax credits, and 
this difference plays an important role for out-of-work families with children. 
Second, the reforms to disability premiums that will be introduced alongside 
Universal Credit create winners and losers (though are revenue-neutral overall under 
the assumptions used by both ourselves and the government). Many single adults 
and lone parents will lose the severe disability premium but will not benefit from the 
increase in the support group premium, but other disabled people will benefit from 
the higher support group premium.  
 
5  THE IMPACT OF UNIVERSAL CREDIT ON WORK INCENTIVES 
This section examines briefly the effect of Universal Credit on the incentive to be in 
paid work, and the incentive for workers to increase earnings. We measure the 
former with the participation tax rate (PTR), or the percentage of earnings lost in tax 
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or withdrawn benefits when an individual moves into work, and we measure the 
latter with the marginal effective tax rate (METR).23  
 
Table 5.1 shows the distribution of PTRs before and after the introduction of 
Universal Credit amongst workers and non-workers combined.  
 
TABLE 5.1 Participation Tax Rates Amongst Working-Age Adults before and after Introduction of Universal 
Credit 
PTR (Percent) Before After 
0-10 2,800,000 2,700,000  
10-20 4,000,000 3,900,000  
20-30 7,100,000 7,000,000  
30-40 8,000,000 7,500,000  
40-50 4,200,000 4,000,000  
50-60 2,600,000 3,500,000  
60-70 1,500,000 2,600,000  
70-80 1,000,000 300,000  
80-90 200,000 <50,000 
90+ 300,000 <50,000 
 
Notes:  Figures rounded to nearest 100,000 adults. Excludes employer NICs and indirect taxes and most 'business taxes' (notably corporation 
tax and business rates) and capital taxes (notably inheritance tax, stamp duties and capital gains tax). In-work incomes for non-
workers are estimated as described in box 2.1 of Adam and Browne (2010). Excludes full-time students and those in families where 
all adults are over State Pension Age.  
Source:  Authors' calculations using the IFS tax and benefit microsimulation model, TAXBEN, run on uprated data from the 2009–10 Family 
Resources Survey.  
 
Universal Credit strengthens the incentives to work for those who have the very 
weakest incentives to work under the current system: there are very few individuals 
with a PTR of 70% or higher after Universal Credit is introduced and 1.4 million fewer 
than under the current system. At present, these very high PTRs arise because 
individuals can lose almost all of their earnings through withdrawn benefits and tax 
credits when they start earning a small amount. Under Universal Credit, though, 
there will be a higher level of disregarded earnings, followed by a combined tax and 
benefit withdrawal rate of no more than 76.2%. Together, these significantly 
strengthen the incentive to earn small amounts. On the other hand, there are some 
people who see their incentive to work weaken through this reform (for example, 
there is an increase in the number of individuals with a PTR of 50% or more by 
900,000); these are mostly workers who would receive less Universal Credit than 
they currently receive in tax credits.  
 
23 We calculate PTRs for workers and non-workers. For non-workers, we use the age, sex, years of education, marriage and 
cohabitation status, number of dependent children, age of youngest child, ethnicity and housing tenure of those not in 
work in the data to predict weekly earnings conditional on being in each of four different hours bands (1–15, 16–23, 24–
29 and 30+), and we use the same characteristics to estimate the likelihood of each individual being in each of these hours 
bands were they to work. This allows us to produce a weighted average PTR for each non-worker. See Adam and Browne 
(2010) for more details.  
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Brewer et al. (2012) show that the pattern of changes in work incentives varies 
significantly according to whether an individual has a partner in work, or not. 
Universal Credit reduces PTRs on average for those in couples whose partner does 
not work, particularly at the lower end of the earnings distribution, but Universal 
Credit will weaken the incentives for couples to have two people in work rather than 
one: this is mostly due to the change from a 41% gross income taper in tax credits to 
a 65% net income taper in Universal Credit; this means that a (potential) second 
earner who is entitled to Universal Credit when out of work will initially lose 65p of 
each pound earned when they move into work, rather than 41p as they do under the 
current tax credit system. 
 
Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of those with high METRs (the top 40% ranked by 
METR) before and after the introduction of Universal Credit for those who are 
currently in work. Universal Credit will mean that there are no METRs above 76.2%, 
but it will increase the number of individuals with METRs higher than 73% and 
increase the number with METRs of 65% or more. However, the vast majority of 
workers will not have their METRs affected by the introduction of Universal Credit: 
they are not entitled to means-tested benefits or tax credits under the current 
system, and will not be entitled to Universal Credit either (and this is why we draw 
the Figure only for the top 40% of the distribution of METRs). 
 
 
FIGURE 5.1 Cumulative Distribution of METRs before and after Introduction of Universal Credit (workers Only; 
Top 40% of METRs only) 
 
Notes:  Excludes employer NICs and indirect taxes and most 'business taxes' (notably corporation tax and business rates) and capital taxes 
(notably inheritance tax, stamp duties and capital gains tax). Excludes full-time students and those in families with someone aged 
over State Pension Age. 
Source:  Authors' calculations using the IFS tax and benefit microsimulation model, TAXBEN, run on uprated data from the 2008–09 Family 
Resources Survey. 
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The Figure hides what is actually a complicated pattern of changes. The most 
significant are as follows: 
• Around 1.3 million workers will see their METR increase from 73% to 76.2%; 
these are basic-rate taxpayers who, if they increase their earnings slightly, 
currently face withdrawal of tax credits, and will face withdrawal of Universal 
Credit.  
• Around 300,000 workers will see their METR increase from 32% to 76.2%; these 
are people who are currently not entitled to means-tested benefits or tax 
credits, but who will become entitled to Universal Credit, and therefore will face 
the withdrawal of Universal Credit if they increase their earnings slightly.  
• Another 600,000 workers – mostly in two-earner couples – will see their METR 
increase from 0% or 41% to 65%; these are non-taxpayers who are entitled to 
Universal Credit, and who face it being withdrawn at a rate of 65p in the pound 
when they increase their income. At present, such workers see tax credits 
withdrawn at a rate of 41%, or keep all of a small increase in earnings if they are 
not entitled to tax credits under the current system.  
• Around 600,000 workers will see METRs fall from above 77% to 76.2% or 65% 
when Universal Credit is introduced; these are workers who currently face a 
simultaneous withdrawal of several benefits or tax credits if they increase their 
earnings.  
• Around 500,000 basic-rate taxpayers who will see their METR fall substantially 
from over 70% to 32% (or just under), and around 250,000 will see their METR 
fall from various values to zero: these are in families currently entitled to tax 
credits, but who will not be entitled to Universal Credit. 
 
As with PTRs, the pattern of changes in METRs varies both by earnings and between 
different types of individuals, as shown in the on-line appendix 
(http://www.ifs.org.uk/docs/fsmar12_breweretal_appendix.pdf) to Brewer et al. 
(2012). 
 
6  CONCLUSION 
The UK government's plan to replace most means-tested benefits and tax credits for 
working-age adults with a single Universal Credit from 2013 will be the largest 
reform to the UK welfare system in the last 25 years.  
 
The impetus for the reform seems to come not from a desire to reduce entitlements 
to welfare benefits, but to produce a system under which it is easier for claimants to 
claim benefits, the gains to work are more transparent, and the amount spent on 
administration and lost in fraud and error is reduced. In our view, these hoped-for 
advantages of Universal Credit come not because it will be simpler: entitlements will 
depend on as wide a range of factors as do the current set of means-tested benefits, 
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and in principle Universal Credit will be able to differentiate between recipients to 
almost the same extent as the current system. Instead, Universal Credit should be 
simpler to understand and implement because it will be integrated: this will reduce 
the number of separate means-tested benefits that people will need to claim, it will 
reduce the number of authorities to which they need to report their personal details, 
and it should mean that claimants need to understand (for example) only one set of 
rules for what counts as income and how excess income reduces entitlements. But 
integrating what is currently a fragmented and non-aligned system is not 
straightforward, and our empirical analysis in Sections 3 and 4 illustrates well the 
constraints all governments face when contemplating major welfare reform. Despite 
the reform acting to increase benefit entitlements, on average, Universal Credit will 
strengthen financial work incentives for some, as intended, but weaken them for 
others, and the reform will create both winners and, in the long run, losers.  
 
 
 
Of course, it is too early to decide whether Universal Credit will be a success. First, 
much will depend upon delivery: moving from the current system of benefits and tax 
credits to a single benefit will require major administrative and IT changes, and this 
is being attempted at a time when spending on benefit administration is being cut. 
Second, many aspects of the design are still preliminary: almost all financial 
parameters have yet to be confirmed, and some important details of design still 
remain unclear. For example, the conditionality regime that will operate under 
Universal Credit could well be more important in determining whether low-skilled 
people work more than the changes to financial work incentives documented in this 
paper. 
 
 
 
However, one strong criticism of the design that we would make at this stage is the 
decision not just to keep the means-tested Council Tax Rebate (CTR) outside of 
Universal Credit but also to devolve its design and delivery to local authorities. There 
are good reasons to think that this will undermine many of the supposed advantages 
of Universal Credit: having CTR operating alongside Universal Credit may mean that 
families continue to have to claim more than one means-tested benefit, and 
continue to have to report circumstances to more than one agency; and having a 
different form of CTR operating in every English Local Authority risks introducing the 
sort of complexity and lack of transparency that the Government says it wants to 
reduce. The way in which this localised CTR is withdrawn as income rises will also 
affect claimants' financial incentives to work.  
 
 
 
Finally, we must not forget that Universal Credit is only one of many changes to 
social security benefits and tax credits announced by the UK government that came 
to power in May 2010: these changes altogether will substantially reduce 
government spending on social security benefits and tax credits and will, as we show 
in a companion piece to this, act to increase relative and absolute measures of 
income poverty over the next decade (Brewer, Browne and Joyce, 2011).  
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3. Work Incentives: New Evidence for 
Ireland1 
T. Callan, C. Keane, M. Savage, J.R. Walsh and K. Timoney 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The influences of tax and welfare structures on financial incentives to work, and 
hence on labour market decisions, have been the subject of many studies.2 In a 
recent review, Blundell (2011) emphasises that "To understand how taxes and 
benefits might affect labor supply choices, we need to measure the effective work 
incentives implicit in the tax and benefit system". This is the main task of this paper. 
We focus on incentives affecting decisions as to whether to engage in paid work or 
not3. The balance between incomes in and out of work has been a key focus of policy 
debate in Ireland for many years, and has attracted particular attention during the 
past year.  
 
The measure of work incentives used in this study is the replacement rate – the ratio 
of out-of-work income to in-work income, explained in more detail in Section 2. This 
measure has been used extensively in OECD analyses (OECD, 2012) and has become 
central in debates about the Irish tax/transfer system. The financial assistance 
provided to Ireland by the IMF and EU institutions brings with it intensive scrutiny of 
Irish economic and social policy. Regular missions from the Troika of EU Commission, 
European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund are concerned not just 
with top-level macroeconomic aggregates, but also with structural policies 
concerning, among other things, the implications of tax and welfare for financial 
incentives to work. In this context, it is vital that comparisons of Ireland's policies 
and situation with those of other EU and OECD countries should be accurate and 
representative. For this reason, Section 3 considers carefully the way in which the 
OECD measures of replacement rates are constructed, and how they should be 
interpreted. IMF Staff Reports, including the recent Article IV report, have been 
strongly influenced by the picture provided by the OECD. We argue that a much 
more careful interpretation of these figures is needed, and show that a more 
 
1  We are grateful to two anonymous referees for helpful comments and to Brian Nolan and Pete Lunn for comments and 
discussions which have greatly helped to improve the paper. Many helpful comments were also received from Corona 
Joyce, Philip O'Connell, Frances Ruane and Emer Smyth. The usual disclaimer applies. 
2  For overviews of empirical results on labour supply responses to tax reforms, see Meghir and Phillips (2010) and Blundell 
and MaCurdy (1999). OECD (2012) maintain an ongoing cross-country database with designed to "reveal general and 
country-specific trends of the generosity and incentive effects of tax and benefit regimes". 
3  Marginal effective tax rates, which measure the incentive to increase earnings by working longer hours or gaining skills, 
were examined in Callan et al. (2011) and will also be the subject of future work. 
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nuanced approach leads to quite different conclusions from those drawn by both 
OECD and IMF. 
 
An alternative approach, used by researchers at the ESRI and the Institute of Fiscal 
Studies (IFS) among others4 has several advantages over that used by the OECD. 
Instead of estimating replacement rates for a selection of hypothetical families, the 
analysis is based on large scale nationally representative survey data. Information on 
incomes, labour market status and family composition is used to simulate for each 
family in the survey the net income an individual would obtain if in employment, or 
if unemployed. This microsimulation approach takes better account of the diversity 
of individual circumstances, and how they affect taxes, benefits and net incomes. 
Crucially it is also able to take account of how common or uncommon particular 
family types are, so that the analysis can produce a truly representative picture of 
the replacement rates faced by the population. In Section 4 we examine results on 
the distribution of replacement rates in Ireland – for those at work and those not in 
the paid labour market as well as those who are unemployed. These findings are 
derived using the SWITCH tax-benefit model, based on data from the CSO's Survey 
on Income and Living Conditions for 2010. They take account of individual variation 
in earnings potential, depending on age, education and marital status. We draw on a 
body of work which has produced microsimulation-based estimates of the 
distribution of replacement rates for selected years from 1987 to the present day, to 
put current results in context. We also present a comparison, based on 
microsimulation estimates, of the extent to which high replacement rates occur in 
the UK and Ireland. 
 
Costs which arise wholly from taking up employment (referred to as in-work costs) 
are widely recognised as relevant to labour market decisions. However, there have 
been few attempts to estimate such costs or incorporate them into measures of 
financial incentives to work. Internationally most attention has focused on childcare. 
Immervoll and Barber (2006) extended the OECD approach to incorporate the costs 
of sending a two-year old to centre-based care. In Section 5 we exploit the 
advantages of data from the CSO's 2010 Survey on Income and Living conditions, 
which provides a broader and more representative picture of childcare use and 
costs. This allows us to explore the potential impact of childcare costs on the net 
reward from employment. Commuting costs could act in a similar way to reduce the 
net financial reward from employment. Data from the Household Budget Survey 
2009-10 and the National Travel Survey 2009 are used to examine the size of travel 
to work costs. These results are combined with the microsimulation model SWITCH, 
based on SILC 2010, to examine the potential impact of travel to work costs on net 
 
4  For example, research by Adam, Brewer and Shephard (2006) and Adam and Browne (2010) at the IFS; and by Callan, 
Nolan and O'Donoghue (1996), Callan, Walsh and Coleman (2006) and Callan et al. (2011) at the ESRI. 
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rewards from employment. Our results, based on recent data and on internationally 
recognised microsimulation techniques, show that the impact of in-work costs on 
the net financial gain from employment is much less than was suggested by Crilly, 
Pentecost and Tol (2012). 
 
2 MEASURING FINANCIAL INCENTIVES TO WORK 
The replacement rate is the most commonly used single measure of work incentives. 
It measures the proportion of in-work income which would be retained or replaced 
(e.g., by jobseeker payments) when out of work. In the next subsection (Section 2.1) 
we outline some key points about the measure and choices made in its 
implementation. First, in order to give a broader understanding of the issues 
involved, we set out some examples to illustrate key issues.  
 
Table 1 below shows out of work income (from Jobseeker Benefit or the maximum 
rate of Jobseeker Allowance) and in-work income, net of income tax, PRSI and the 
Universal Social Charge, for a range of family types and earnings levels. For a single 
person, replacement rates can be in the region of 35 per cent for an adult with an 
entitlement to the maximum rate of Jobseeker's Benefit and a potential job at the 
average wage. A young person aged 18 to 21 faces a similarly low replacement rate, 
with a potential job at the minimum wage, and an entitlement to the young person's 
rate of Jobseeker's Allowance. An adult on a low (2/3 of average earnings) or 
minimum wage would face a higher replacement rate of up to 56 per cent. 
Replacement rates for those who receive additions to their welfare payments in 
respect of a spouse and/or children tend to be higher. But there is still considerable 
variation in these groups, depending on the wage faced. In reality, there is also 
variation depending on the work status and income of the spouse, which may reduce 
or eliminate such additional payments. 
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TABLE 1 Illustrations of In-Work Disposable Income, Out-of-Work Disposable Income and Replacement Rates: 
Ireland 2012 
 
Out-of-Work 
Income 
In-Work Income Replacement 
Rate 
 
€ p a € p a 
 
 
Single person 
18-21 year old, minimum wage, 
Jobseeker's Allowance 5,214 14,059 37% 
Adult, minimum wage,  
Jobseeker Benefit 9,802 17,402 56% 
Adult, 2/3 of average wage, 
Jobseeker Benefit 9,802 21,066 47% 
Adult, average wage,  
Jobseeker Benefit 9,802 28,944 34% 
 
Married, 1 earner, no children 
Adult, minimum wage,  
Jobseeker Benefit 16,283 18,291 89% 
Adult, 2/3 of average wage,  
Jobseeker Benefit 16,283 23,361 70% 
Adult, average wage,  
Jobseeker Benefit 16,283 32,828 50% 
 
Note:  Both in-work and out-of-work incomes refer to incomes after tax, PRSI and Universal Social Charge and Child Benefit. Average 
wage for 2012 Q2 is €687.84, as per CSO Earnings and Labour Costs. 
 
Even with a small number of examples, and before addressing the complications 
associated with children, we can see considerable variation in the level of 
replacement rates, from a low of 34 per cent to a high of 89 per cent. No one of 
these can represent the true situation for all of those who are unemployed – ranging 
from those who are single to those who are married with children, and from those 
with low educational qualifications to university graduates. Adding more examples 
does not help to establish what is typical – instead we have to perform calculations 
for a nationally representative sample. This is the approach taken in a series of 
papers by researchers at the Institute of Fiscal Studies in the UK (Adam et al., 2006; 
Adam and Browne, 2010) and by researchers at the ESRI (Callan et al., 1995; Callan 
et al., 2007; Callan et al., 2011). Sections 4 and 5 present new results based on 
SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model, which provide an up-to-date representative 
picture of replacement rates in Ireland. 
 
There is no general agreement as to a particular cut-off above which high 
replacement rates have strong effects on labour supply decisions. It may be helpful 
to clarify what different levels of replacement rate imply for the income gain that an 
individual would experience in moving from unemployment to employment.  
• A replacement rate of 50% means that an individual's net income would double 
when moving from unemployment to employment 
• A replacement rate of 67% means that an individual's net income would rise by 
50% when moving from unemployment to employment. 
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• A replacement rate of more than 100% or more means that the individual would 
lose net income when moving from unemployment to employment. 
 
Earlier work in this area (Callan et al., 2007) has found that there are significant 
numbers of individuals in employment who have replacement rates of over 100 per 
cent. Why might individuals choose to stay in employment in such circumstances, 
when it seems that they would be financially better off on the dole? Several reasons 
can be suggested, such as: 
1. Replacement rates measure the financial gain from employment in static terms; 
but staying in work tends to lead to higher wages in future, so there are also 
dynamic gains which are not taken into account here or in other work on 
replacement rates. 
2. Individuals may choose to work in such circumstances for reasons such as self-
respect, providing an example to their children, or the non-financial rewards 
from working life. 
 
In looking at replacement rates it is useful to distinguish two different perspectives. 
Viewed from one perspective, high replacement rates can be seen as potentially 
damaging the financial incentive to work. But from another perspective, 
replacement rates need to be "high enough" to provide an adequate floor to income 
for those who become unemployed. In striking a balance between these 
perspectives, policy must grapple with the fact that there is considerable variation 
both in needs (related to family size, for example) and in potential wages (which 
vary, but mainly in response to factors such as productivity rather than needs). If 
policy in this area had only one goal – either maximising the financial incentive to 
work, or attaining an income target for the unemployed – then setting the level and 
structure of welfare payments would be relatively straightforward. It is the need to 
balance the potentially conflicting concerns of income support and work incentive 
goals which means that careful monitoring of both the income support and work 
incentive outcomes is needed. 
 
2.1  Replacement Rates5 
We examine the financial work incentives facing both single persons and couples6, 
taking account of the ways in which tax and welfare entitlements are affected by the 
number and ages of dependent children. For a single person who is unemployed or 
not at work, we simulate the welfare payments they get when not in work, and the 
 
5  The basic rationale underlying the replacement rate was described by Callan et al. (2011), while Callan et al. (2007) 
contains a more detailed discussion. 
6  The small numbers of cohabiting couples in the SILC survey mean that a separate analysis of their situation is not yet 
possible, but their broad treatment by the tax and welfare systems is incorporated in the model. 
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resulting net income. This is compared with an estimate of the net income they 
would obtain if they were employed – something which would depend on the wage 
they are likely to be able to obtain in the labour market. Potential wages are 
influenced by such factors as educational qualifications and age or experience. For 
example, other things being equal, someone with a university degree is likely to 
obtain a higher wage than someone whose highest qualification is a Junior 
Certificate. 
 
We examine the incentives facing both partners in a couple, taking each person in 
turn. When examining incentives facing one spouse, we hold the labour market 
participation of the partner constant. In so doing, we take into account the overall 
impact of the change on family income. Adult children are regarded as separate 
decision making units, but the impact of the household means test ("benefit and 
privilege") applying to young adults living with their parents is taken into account, as 
are the new, lower rates of payment for Jobseeker's Allowance for those aged under 
25. 
 
The financial incentive for an individual to move from unemployment into 
employment depends on the family's disposable income7 when the individual is 
unemployed and the family's disposable income when the individual is employed. A 
narrow focus on the individual's own net income would fail to take account of the 
possible impact of an individual's taking up employment on the social welfare 
entitlements and/or income tax liabilities of his or her spouse or partner.  
 
The replacement rate summarises this information by taking out-of-work income as 
a proportion of in-work income at the level of the family unit: 
incomedisposablefamilyworkIn
incomedisposablefamilyworkofOutRR =  
For example, an individual might find that his or her family income when 
unemployed is €180 per week, but that on taking up a job that disposable income 
would rise to €300 per week. The replacement rate in this situation would be 60 per 
cent.  
 
Standard microeconomic theory suggests that an increase in the hourly wage rate 
faced by an individual has two distinct effects (Duncan and Giles, 1997)8 :  
 
7  Disposable income is cash income from all sources – including wages and salaries, profits, pensions, interest, dividends 
and welfare payments –net of taxes, levies and social insurance contributions. 
8  See Duncan and Giles (ibid) for a graphical illustration of the argument. 
Work  Incen t ives :  New E vidence for  I re land | 55  
• a higher net wage means that the individual would have more to gain from an 
additional hour of employment (This is referred to as a positive substitution 
effect).  
• the wage increase also means that individual needs to work fewer hours to 
obtain the same net income (This is labelled a negative income effect).  
 
In general, the balance between these opposing effects is ambiguous. In the case 
where the individual is unemployed (or not employed) there is no income effect, as 
there is initially no wage income. Thus theory predicts a positive incentive effect 
associated with a higher wage – and this is captured by the replacement rate 
measure, as a higher wage means that in-work income rises while out-of-work 
income is constant. However, if non-employment income rises (e.g., an increase in 
child benefit), theory predicts that the impact on labour supply will be negative. The 
replacement rate measure increases if non-employment income rises, in line with 
the theoretical prediction. 
 
In addition to these theoretical considerations, replacement rates have been in 
widespread use in policy debate (see, most recently, NESC, 2011). In an international 
context, they are extensively used by the OECD. Thus, for both theoretical and 
practical reasons, the replacement rate measure is the one we focus on in this paper. 
 
2.2 Estimating Replacement Rates Using Nationally Representative Survey Data 
Microsimulation modelling provides a means of analysing the replacement rates 
facing individuals9 on the basis of detailed micro-level data gathered in a large-scale 
household sample. Essentially, the tax-benefit model is first used to simulate the 
disposable income of the nuclear family unit (sometimes termed the tax unit) when 
the individual is unemployed. This involves simulation of the relevant social welfare 
unemployment compensation and of income tax liabilities, as well as the universal 
child benefit. The counterfactual situation, where the individual is employed, is then 
modelled. Again, the tax-benefit model is used to estimate the disposable income 
the tax unit would have in that situation, taking into account changes in social 
welfare entitlements and tax liabilities, and, where relevant, entitlement to Family 
Income Supplement (FIS) – the social welfare benefit targeted at low income families 
depending on wage earnings. In these calculations the gross earnings of the spouse 
are held constant, but their net earnings or benefit receipt may be affected by their 
 
9  As noted earlier, the calculations for each individual incorporate the net impact on the income of the nuclear family e.g., if 
one spouse/partner earns more, this may have an impact on the benefit or tax payable by the other spouse. 
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partner's employment status10. The replacement rate is then calculated as the ratio 
of family income when out-of-work to family income when in work. 
 
For people who are not currently in paid work,11 a key issue is how much they could 
expect to earn if they were employed. One approach is to use a particular gross 
earnings level – such as (some proportion of) average industrial earnings or the 
minimum wage – as the prospective earnings for all those not currently in work. This 
approach is typically used in the context of "example household" calculations. For 
example, the OECD produces estimates of replacement rates at average wages and 
at 67 per cent of average earnings. However, this takes no account of the variation 
between individuals in the wages that they can reasonably expect to earn in the 
labour market. Under this approach the same wage would be used for someone who 
has dropped out of school with no qualifications and for a graduate, for example. 
Others might argue for an examination of replacement rates at the minimum wage – 
which is below the usual OECD low wage scenario of 67% of average earnings. But 
this would ignore the fact that only a small proportion of jobs are at the minimum 
wage; and that a scenario in which jobs are created only at the minimum wage is 
unrealistic.12  
 
There is a more persuasive approach. Empirical studies employing micro-data to 
examine incentive effects typically use a predicted wage which takes into account 
such individual characteristics. For example, this is the approach used in Adam et al. 
(2010) in the Mirrlees Review (Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2010). – now a major 
landmark in tax policy analysis. This is the concept used in our microsimulation 
approach (following earlier work by Callan et al. 1996) and in Adam et al. (2006) and 
Adam and Browne (2010). The key point is that jobseekers vary in the wage that they 
can reasonably expect to attain in the labour market, and that a method which 
allows for this is more realistic than a "one wage fits all" approach.  
 
Wage equations are estimated separately for four categories: single women, single 
men, married women and married men.13 The key variables used to predict hourly 
wages are age (and its square, to allow for a positive but decreasing impact) and five 
levels of educational qualification (none beyond primary is the base case, followed 
 
10  For example, net earnings may be affected because if a partner moves out of employment, the partner remaining in 
employment may face a lower tax bill. Conversely, if one spouse enters employment, this may lead to a reduction in social 
welfare benefit for the other spouse. 
11  This includes those who are unemployed – whether or not they receive any jobseeker payment – and those who classify 
themselves as not in the paid labour market.  
12  Our approach includes examination of replacement rates at the minimum wage for individuals who are likely to face such 
low wages. 
13  The difference between this approach and one which uses separate dummy variables for each gender/marital status 
combination is that the approach taken here allows for coefficients on other variables, such as educational qualifications 
or age, to vary by gender and marital status. 
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by Junior Certificate or equivalent, Leaving Certificate, non-degree third level, and 
third-level degree or higher). Adam and Browne (2010) use a similar approach to 
estimate wages for non-workers in the UK, including also characteristics such as 
ethnicity and housing status to explain expected wages. Those who are in 
employment may differ from those who are not in employment not only in 
measured characteristics (such as age or education) but also in terms of unmeasured 
characteristics (for example, health or ability). We allow for this possibility, using the 
Heckman method to allow for self-selection into employment. The number of 
children, as well as the variables in the wage equation, also influencing selection into 
paid employment. The minimum wage for those under 18 years of age, which at 
€6.06 is 30 per cent below the general minimum wage, is used as a floor for 
predicted wages.14 Weekly earnings are generated on the basis of a job with a 40 
hour week – this is the modal value reported by full-time workers in SILC 2010. As 
these reported hours data are used in the generation of hourly wages for those in 
work, which are the basis for the wage equation, the full-time hours figure used here 
must be consistent with that data. 
 
For those who are in employment, estimating a replacement rate requires a 
simulation of the income they would obtain if they were unemployed. The main 
issue to be decided here is whether the replacement rate should be calculated on 
the basis of an entitlement to Jobseeker's Benefit(JB), or to Jobseeker's Allowance 
(JA). The qualification conditions for Jobseeker's Benefit mean that not all of those in 
employment would qualify for it. Those who did qualify would receive it for a 
maximum of one year, then transferring to the JA rate if they remained unemployed 
and satisfied the search for work criterion. In many instances, the payments received 
on JA and JB would be the same; but where differences occur, the rate on JB would 
be higher, meaning that some of those who are employed would have a higher 
replacement rate for up to a year, if the calculation were done in terms of an 
entitlement to JB. Two considerations point towards the use of the JA rate. First, if 
the in-work/out of work decision is thought of as a long-term one, then the JA rate 
would be the more relevant one. Second, much of the focus in recent debate (IMF, 
2012; OECD, 2011) has been on long-term replacement rates. For these reasons, we 
focus here on calculations which are based on the JA rate. It should be noted that 
only the replacement rates of those who are currently employed would be affected 
by an alternative treatment seeking to apply JB rates instead of JA rates. Changing 
this assumption would have no impact on replacement rates for those who are 
currently unemployed or not in the paid labour market. Shifting to allow JB where 
individuals qualify for it would make replacement rates for employees somewhat 
higher – but the individuals concerned are still observed to be in employment. 
 
14  We allow for the fact that wages cannot be perfectly predicted – an error term, drawn from the normal distribution, is 
added to the predictions to ensure that the "spread" of predicted wages is in line with what is indicated by the estimated 
wage equation.  
58  | Budget  Persp ect ives 2013  
The appropriate treatment of Family Income Supplement (FIS) is also an issue. 
Entitlement to FIS is modelled by SWITCH on the basis of the parameters of the 
scheme, and FIS entitlements can be included as part of in-work income in the 
calculation of replacement rates. However, some research suggests that the take-up 
of this scheme appears to be particularly low, with perhaps only one-third of those 
entitled actually in receipt of the payment (Callan et al., 2005).15 For this reason we 
present detailed results on the basis of a low take-up assumption, under which one 
in three of those entitled to FIS is attributed that benefit.16 If take-up of FIS is higher 
than 1 in 3, then the incidence of high replacement rates would be lower than 
estimated here, because FIS is well targeted on those facing high replacement rate. 
 
3 INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS BASED ON EXAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS 
Irish policy needs to be based, among other things, on accurate information on how 
the Irish system compares with other countries. This has become all the more 
important with the influence of the Troika on Irish economic policy. The most 
extensive international database on work incentives is that developed and 
maintained by the OECD. (www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives) This large and 
complex database involves calculations of in-work incomes and out-of-work incomes 
for a range of family types and income levels. OECD (2012) states that:  
"Net replacement rates, calculated taking tax-benefit regimes into account and 
considering the family as a whole, show the proportion of in-work income that is 
maintained when someone is unemployed, and provide important insights when 
considering both benefit generosity and incentives to work." 
 
 Much effort is devoted to ensuring that the underlying calculations are accurate, 
and very comprehensive documentation and web resources are provided to allow 
users to understand how the statistics are derived. The OECD statistics on financial 
incentives to work include standardised calculations for a wide range of different 
situations e.g., for different family types, different wage levels and differing access to 
benefits. While the calculations regarding the individual cases are accurate, some 
interpretations of the results do not take into account the composition of actual 
unemployment, and the extent to which "add-on" payments are or are not received 
by the unemployed population. These factors, as will be shown, can have a 
substantial impact on how benefit regimes compare in practice. 
 
15  A study by Millward Brown IMS (2008) concludes that take-up of FIS is high. The contrast between the results seems to 
reflect differences in the time period over which income is assessed, when trying to establish whether cases are eligible 
for FIS or not. The Millward Brown study was based on an annual income, while the Callan et al. (2005) study was based 
on current income at the time of the survey. The time period actually used for assessment of FIS eligibility lies between 
these two. 
16  Because FIS is a small scheme, the numbers in receipt of FIS in surveys such as the Survey on Income and Living Conditions 
(SILC) are rather small. This means that detailed analysis of the determinants of non-take-up, such as can be undertaken 
with the UK's large-scale Family Resources Survey, is not possible here. So although take-up is likely to be higher for larger 
entitlements, our analysis is based on a simple random assignment to the take-up and non-take-up categories. 
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OECD's most recent Economic Survey of Ireland (OECD, 2011) claims that "After very 
substantial increases up to 2009, long-term unemployment benefit replacement 
rates in Ireland stand among the highest in the OECD". The IMF echoes this 
conclusion "The flat structure of unemployment payments results in replacement 
rates for the long-term unemployed that are high by international standards, 
contributing to low exit rates from the Live Register." (IMF, 2012). Pina (2011), in an 
OECD Working Paper claims "NRRs [net replacement rates] after a long 
unemployment spell become very high in international comparison." (Pina, 2011, p. 
9). When a more careful interpretation is undertaken, we find that for most of 
Ireland's unemployed the financial incentive to work, as measured by the OECD's net 
replacement rate, is similar to that for many EU-15 countries. 
 
Two factors need to be borne in mind when interpreting OECD numbers regarding 
the Irish situation: 
1. About 70 per cent of Ireland's unemployed receive only the personal rate of 
Jobseeker's Benefit or Allowance. They are either single and childless, or if 
married do not qualify for additional payments in respect of a spouse and/or 
children: they are ruled out because of income or means-tests. (National 
Economic and Social Council, 2011) 
2. Latest available figures (Department of Social Protection, 2012) indicate that 
about 88 per cent of those who are unemployed did not receive a Rent and 
Mortgage Supplement. 
 
This means that international comparisons based on the entitlements of single, 
childless people who do not qualify for Rent and Mortgage Supplement are the most 
relevant for a substantial majority of Ireland's unemployed. In Table 2 below, we 
present the OECD figures for short-run replacement rates for the EU15, and for the 
USA and Japan; figures for long-run replacement rates are presented later in this 
section. 
 
It is clear from the table that very different pictures emerge depending on whether 
or not it is assumed that the individual, when unemployed, receives Rent and 
Mortgage Supplement (RMS). Statistics from the Department of Social Protection 
(2012) indicate that less than 12 per cent of the unemployed receive Rent or 
Mortgage Supplement. While those who do receive it undoubtedly face high 
replacement rates, more than 7 out of 8 unemployed people do not receive this 
supplement, and the replacement rate they face is much lower. Table 2, based on 
OECD figures, suggests that single people and lone parents in Ireland face short-run 
replacement rates which are among the lowest in the OECD. For a one-earner couple 
with two children, the replacement rate in Ireland is close to the European average. 
Only in the case of a one-earner couple without children is the Irish rate, without 
RMS, above the European average. 
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These results are based on a low-wage scenario, at two-thirds of the average wage. 
As Irish unemployment compensation is flat-rate, replacement rates for Ireland are 
lower when using the average wage as a benchmark. As many European countries 
have earnings-linked benefits Irish replacement rates at average wages are lower 
relative to other countries.  
 
Some similar considerations apply to the UK with respect to Housing Benefit. 
Replacement rates are very different depending on whether or not it is assumed that 
the individual receives Housing Benefit. Here, however, the balance between those 
receiving and not receiving Housing Benefit is rather even, with about half in each 
category. This points, among other things, to the dangers involved in simply 
comparing "headline numbers" such as the payment rates for Jobseeker payments in 
Ireland and the UK. To do so would miss the fact that about half of the UK 
unemployed also receive Housing Benefit, which can be substantial. Rather than 
attempting to "average away" this problem, microsimulation estimates in the next 
section will take account of who does, and does not, receive Housing Benefit in the 
UK and who does, or does not, receive Rent and Mortgage Supplement in Ireland. 
The microsimulation estimate will also take account of policy features such as the 
lower rates of unemployment payment for younger people. 
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TABLE 2  Short-Run Replacement Rates at 67% of the Average Wage: Ireland, with (88% Of Cases) and Without 
(12% Of Cases) Rent and Mortgage Supplement (RMS), in International Context 
Single  One-earner couple, 
No children 
 
One-earner couple,  
2 children 
 
One-parent family, 
2 children 
UK without HB 19  UK without HB 30 
 
UK without HB 54 
 
UK without HB 45 
IRELAND 
without RMS 
51  USA 61 
 
USA 61 
 
USA 60 
UK with HB 54  Germany 61 
 
France 73 
 
IRELAND 
without RMS 
66 
Austria 55  Greece 63 
 
Italy 73 
 
Greece 71 
Greece 58  UK+ 
HB 
65 
 
Greece 75 
 
UK with 
HB 
72 
USA 60  France 66 
 
Spain 75 
 
Austria 72 
Germany 61  Austria 69 
 
Germany 77 
 
Italy 76 
Finland 64  Italy 74 
 
Portugal 77 
 
Germany 76 
Sweden 68  Portugal 75 
 
Belgium 77 
 
Netherlands 76 
Japan 68  Spain 75 
 
UK with 
HB 
78 
 
Spain 77 
France 69  Sweden 76 
 
IRELAND 
without RMS 
78 
 
France 78 
Italy 71  Belgium 76 
 
Austria 82 
 
Portugal 79 
Portugal 75  Finland 80 
 
Netherlands 84 
 
Sweden 81 
Netherlands 76  IRELAND 
without RMS 
82 
 
Sweden 86 
 
Ireland with 
RMS 
82 
Ireland with RMS  76  Japan 86 
 
Japan 90 
 
Finland 85 
Spain 80  Netherlands 87 
 
Finland 93 
 
Belgium 88 
Luxembourg 82  Denmark 90 
 
Ireland with 
RMS 
94 
 
Japan 89 
Denmark 84  Luxembourg 98 
 
Denmark 95 
 
Luxembourg 89 
Belgium 89  Ireland with RMS 108 
 
Luxembourg 100 
 
Denmark 90 
 
Note:  These are short-run rates assuming that the individual qualifies for insurance-based unemployment benefit, and without social 
assistance top-ups. For most countries few "top-ups" are available, with the UK Housing Benefit and Ireland's Rent and Mortgage 
Supplement being among the few exceptions: these are explicitly identified as alternatives here. 
Sources:  OECD (2012) and EU Tax and benefits indicators database 
 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/tax_benefits_indicators/documents/tbi_database.xlsm 
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TABLE 3  OECD long-run replacement rates at 67% of the average wage:  
 Ireland without (88% of cases) and with (12% of cases) Rent and Mortgage Supplement RMS 
Single  
One-earner couple,  
no children  
One-earner couple,  
2 children  
One-parent family, 
2 children 
Greece 0 
 
Greece 0 
 
Italy 0 
 
Italy 0 
Italy 0 
 
Italy 0 
 
Greece 4 
 
Greece 12 
USA 10 
 
USA 17 
 
Spain 45 
 
UK without HB 30 
UK without HB 19 
 
UK without HB 30 
 
USA 45 
 
USA 40 
Portugal 23 
 
Spain 40 
 
UK without HB 54 
 
Spain 46 
Spain 33 
 
Portugal 45 
 
Denmark 64 
 
Portugal 52 
Germany 47 
 
Denmark 53 
 
France 66 
 
Sweden 61 
France 48 
 
France 56 
 
Portugal 70 
 
France 63 
IRELAND 
without RMS 
51 
 
Germany 61 
 
Belgium 74 
 
IRELAND 
without RMS 
66 
Austria 53 
 
UK 65 
 
Germany 77 
 
Austria 68 
UK 54 
 
Belgium 66 
 
IRELAND 
without RMS 
78 
 
Netherlands 68 
Finland 59 
 
Austria 69 
 
UK 78 
 
Finland 71 
Sweden 61 
 
Sweden 76 
 
Netherlands 80 
 
Luxembourg 72 
Luxembourg 62 
 
Finland 80 
 
Austria 82 
 
UK 72 
Japan 64 
 
IRELAND 
without RMS 
82 
 
Sweden 86 
 
Germany 76 
Belgium 70 
 
Luxembourg 84 
 
Luxembourg 88 
 
Ireland with RMS 82 
Netherlands 73 
 
Japan 86 
 
Japan 90 
 
Belgium 83 
Ireland with RMS 77 
 
Netherlands 86 
 
Finland 93 
 
Denmark 84 
Denmark 79 
 
Ireland with RMS 108 
 
Ireland with RMS 94 
 
Japan 89 
 
Note:  These are long-run replacement rates after insurance-based unemployment benefits are exhausted. While OECD's published tables 
show Ireland with Rent and Mortgage Supplement included, this table shows figures both with and without the supplement, given 
that about 7 out of 8 unemployed people do not receive it. 
Sources:  OECD (2012) and EU Tax and benefits indicators database 
 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/tax_benefits_indicators/documents/tbi_database.xlsm 
 
Table 3 shows corresponding figures for long-run replacement rates (at the end of 5 
years of unemployment).For single people, one-earner couples with two children 
and lone parents with two children Irish replacement rates without Rent and 
Mortgage Supplement (i.e., the rate relevant to 7 out of 8 of the unemployed) are 
towards the middle of the international ranking . Countries with similar replacement 
rates for these family types include France, Austria and Germany. The main change 
in terms of rankings is that Greece, Italy, Spain and the US have very low (sometimes 
zero) figures for long-term replacement rates. For one-earner couples without 
children, the Irish replacement rate is above average, with only three countries 
having higher figures (Luxembourg, Japan and the Netherlands). Irish replacement 
rates with Rent and Mortgage Supplement are over 100 per cent for a one-earner 
couple without children – but this supplement is received by only 1 in 8 of the 
unemployed. 
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OECD (2011) continues the practice of comparing countries using an unweighted 
average of the replacement rates for a number of family types (four in this case) and 
earnings levels (67% and 100% of average wages). This practice means that each of 
the family type/earnings level combinations receives equal weight, as if they were 
equally common. In fact, the structure of Irish unemployment is, as discussed above, 
quite different – strongly weighted towards single people, where Irish replacement 
rates are lower than European averages in the short-run, and close to average in the 
long-run. This compounds the problem of treating the long-term unemployed in 
Ireland as if they all receive Rent and Mortgage Supplement, when in fact this is 
received only by a small minority. 
 
The failure of selected examples to adequately represent real populations was one 
of the motivating forces behind the construction and use of microsimulation models 
based on nationally representative survey data. It is to such models that we turn in 
the next section, to obtain a more accurate profile of the replacement rates facing 
the Irish population – and a comparison with a similar profile for the UK. 
 
4  ESTIMATES BASED ON NATIONALLY REPRESENTATIVE HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS  
We focus initially on new results for 2012. These are based on SILC data for 2010. 
The income data are uprated in line with (small) income growth over the 2010-2012 
period, and are also adjusted to give a better representation of the income tax base, 
using Income Distribution Statistics published by the Revenue Commissioners. (See 
Callan et al., 2012 for further details). Our initial focus is on replacement rates facing 
those who are unemployed, as these are a focus of particular concern and can be 
compared with results for some earlier years. (When turning to comparisons with 
the UK we focus on all persons, those in employment, and those who are either 
unemployed or not participating in the paid labour market – a group consisting 
mainly of those caring for children or the elderly). Table 4 shows the distribution of 
replacement rates for unemployed people who are in receipt of Jobseekers Benefit 
or Jobseeker's Allowance. (There are also unemployed people who for various 
reasons, including means-testing, are not in receipt of any payment. Typically their 
replacement rates tend to be lower as there is no loss of welfare benefit when 
entering employment.) 
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TABLE 4 Estimated Distribution of Unemployed Persons in Receipt of Jobseeker's Benefit or Allowance by 
Replacement Rate Category, 2012 
Replacement rate % 
Less than 20% 4.1 
20%-30% 10.2 
30%-40% 16.5 
40%-50% 15.7 
50%-60% 14.1 
60%-70% 10.8 
70%-80% 8.4 
80%-90% 6.1 
90%-100% 6.4 
Over 100% 7.8 
 100.0 
 
The average (mean) replacement rate facing unemployed people in receipt of 
Jobseeker payments is 56 per cent (with the median replacement rate at 53 per 
cent). But it is clear that there is wide variation in the level of replacement rate 
faced. Close to 73 per cent of the unemployed face a replacement rate of less than 
70 per cent – implying that income would rise by at least 40 per cent for those 
moving into employment. There are, however, significant numbers of unemployed 
people – about 8 per cent – facing replacement rates of over 100 per cent, indicating 
that they would experience a cash loss from moving into employment. Our analysis 
indicates that in more than 6 out of 10 cases where the replacement rate is over 100 
per cent, the unemployed person is in receipt of Rent and Mortgage Supplement. 
The reason that this payment creates particularly high replacement rates is that it is 
available to those who are not in employment, but, in effect, it is not available to 
those who are in employment. The impact of the Rent and Mortgage Supplement 
scheme on replacement rate was highlighted in Callan et al. (2006). Our analysis 
indicates that about 7 out of 10 of the unemployed recipients of RMS face 
replacement rates of over 80 per cent. 
 
Some individuals have been identified as having longer-term housing needs and have 
been moved from the RMS scheme to the Rental Accommodation Scheme (RAS). 
Support on this scheme is available to those in employment, with the level of 
support being reduced as income rises: this is less inimical to work incentives than 
the all-or-nothing, employment status based approach of the RMS. A new "housing 
assistance payment" is being considered (Department of Finance, 2012). This 
payment would not depend on employment/unemployment status, and would 
replace the Rent and Mortgage Supplement scheme. The design of such a scheme, 
balancing levels of support, the rate of withdrawal (which affects work incentives) 
and overall cost is a very challenging task. Housing Benefit in the UK has become a 
major part of overall income support, costing almost £20 billion, or over 10 per cent 
of government spending on social security benefits (Jin et al., 2012). The damaging 
impact of RMS on incentives is, in part, related to its intention to keep overall cost 
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low – this was done by excluding those in employment from eligibility, when a 
scheme which tapered entitlements based on income rather than employment 
status would have cost more. Resolving this problem will require careful advance 
planning. Microsimulation modelling of possible options could play a useful role in 
this regard. 
 
The complexities surrounding entitlements to medical cards mean that this non-cash 
benefit is not taken into account in the present paper. We can note that there are 
some parallels between the impact of RMS on replacement rates and the role of the 
General Medical Services card. (Callan et al., 2006) While medical cards are not 
directly conditioned on employment status, the structure of the means test 
governing eligibility for the medical card means that most of those relying wholly on 
welfare payments qualify, while relatively few of those in work will do so. This issue 
was considered by Callan et al. (2006), who found that when the value of the 
medical card was taken into account, the incidence of high replacement rates rose. 
Since then, the introduction of a GP visit card will have softened the "all or nothing" 
nature of medical card withdrawal into a stepped withdrawal. However, there is still 
some adverse impact on the financial incentive to work. The policy goal of free 
primary health care for all – driven by reasons to do with health promotion, equity 
and more efficient use of scarce resources – would, if attained, help to improve 
incentives to work. It is noteworthy that for the UK and for most of the EU-15, the 
nature of the health care systems means that work incentives are not adversely 
affected as they are in Ireland. 
 
Table 5 takes a closer look at the higher end of the replacement rate distribution for 
2012, and compares it with findings for 2005 and 2010. Direct comparisons with 
years prior to 2005 are not possible because 2005 was the first year in which the 
SWITCH model captured the impact of the RMS scheme. The results now show the 
percentage of the unemployed with replacement rates above various cut offs from 
70 per cent to 100 per cent. The proportions of high (over 70% or 80%) and very high 
(over 90% or 100%) replacement rates have fallen between 2005 and 2012. At the 
70% cut off the fall was about 3 percentage points, while at the 80% cut off the fall 
has been sharper, from 25% to 20%. At the upper levels (replacement rates above 90 
or 100 per cent) the incidence was approximately stable or fell slightly. 17  
 
Unemployment rose from 4 per cent in 2005 to about 14 per cent in 2010 and 2012, 
while the incidence of high replacement rates fell somewhat. These results suggest, 
 
17  The figures for 2010 and 2012, which are now based on SILC data for 2010, are higher than estimates based on 2008 data 
in Callan et al. (2011). While updating and reweighting techniques have proved very useful over the years, this is an 
instance where new data, to reflect the huge rise in unemployment, and changes in its composition, are essential. The 
new figures reflect changes in the scale and composition of unemployment between 2008 and 2010, rather than any "on 
the ground" change over the past year. 
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as might be expected, that the rise in unemployment was largely a macroeconomic 
phenomenon rather than something driven by a rise in replacement rates. 
 
TABLE 5  Distribution of High Replacement Rates, 2005, 2010 and 2012 Unemployed on Jobseeker's Benefit or 
Jobseeker's Allowance 
Policy Year 2005 2010 2012 
Above 70% 31.7 30.7 28.6 
Above 80% 25.2 21.5 20.3 
Above 90% 14.5 14.9 14.2 
Above 100% 9.0 8.9 7.8 
 
Note: 1. 2005 and 2010 estimates based on SWITCH analyses of data for the respective years. 2012 estimate based on SWITCH 
 analysis of SILC 2010 with policy updated to 2012. 
 
Some factors contributing to high replacement rates are outside the direct control of 
policy. For example, an individual with a high-earning spouse may face a high 
replacement rate because his or her additional earnings would represent a small 
proportion of total family income. Let us focus for the moment on what policy 
factors contribute to the incidence of very high replacement rates.  
 
• We have already identified Rent and Mortgage Supplement as being a major 
contributory factor to the highest replacement rates. About 7 out of 10 of those 
receiving RMS are estimated to have high replacement rate (above 70%) and 4 
out of 10 of those receiving RMS are found to have very high (above 90%) 
replacement rates. 
• The Irish welfare system's payment of an Increase for a Qualified Adult (IQA) 
also tends to raise replacement rates.18 
• Similarly, increases in respect of qualified children (IQC), which are paid to 
welfare recipients, but not to those in employment, tend to raise replacement 
rates. 
 
A closer examination of actual families having high replacement rates will help to 
identify the roles played by these different factors. Proposals for the reform of child 
income support, such as the integrated child benefit option developed by the 
Department of Social Protection (2010) can also be evaluated in terms of their 
distributional and incentive impacts – but this is beyond the scope of the current 
paper. 
 
Table 6 compares recent UK estimates of the incidence of high replacement rates 
with our estimates for Ireland. The comparison should be regarded as an 
approximate one: while the broad approach adopted in the two studies is similar. 
 
18  An increase is paid in respect of a qualified adult if his or her income falls below certain limits. An increase is payable to 
welfare beneficiaries in respect of children, with full payment being made if there is no non-welfare income; a half 
payment is made if the income of the claimants spouse exceeds a given limit. 
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There may be some differences in definitions of the relevant populations.19 For both 
workers and non-workers, the incidence of high replacement rates (over 70% or over 
80%) is higher in the UK than in Ireland. For rates above 90%, Ireland has a higher 
incidence, particularly for non-workers. For rates above 100%, the UK appears to 
have a very low incidence, while the incidence in Ireland is close to 4 per cent for 
both workers and non-workers. 
 
 
TABLE 6  Incidence of High Replacement Rates, Ireland and the UK 
Workers Workers Non Workers All 
% with 
replacement 
rate above 
UK 
2009-10 
Ireland 
2012 
UK 
2009-10 
Ireland 
2012 
UK 
2009-10 
Ireland 
2012 
70% 21.8 19.6 37.2 32.7 26.1 23.5 
80% 11.4 11.4 20.0 17.2 13.8 13.1 
90% 3.8 6.5 5.0 9.5 4.1 7.4 
100% 0.3 4.5 0.2 4.4 0.3 4.4 
 
Sources: UK: Adam and Browne (2010), Figure 2.5: as the figures are derived by reading from a graph they should not be regarded as exact. 
  Ireland: Authors' estimates using SWITCH model based on SILC 2010. 
 
These results point towards the Irish system as giving rise to some very high 
replacement rates, more frequently than is observed in the UK. But this does not 
seem to be a generalised problem of high replacement rates, as the incidence of 
rates above 70 per cent and 80 per cent is lower than that in the UK. From a policy 
perspective, this reinforces the importance of identifying the causes of very high 
replacement rates, rather than seeing the issue as one which requires generalised 
measures affecting all those who are unemployed. 
 
5 IN-WORK COSTS 
While many studies (e.g., OECD 2011; Adam and Browne, 2010) mention the 
existence of costs which arise from being in employment, most notably childcare 
costs and travel to work costs, very few studies actually attempt to estimate such 
costs. In part this is due to the difficulties involved in correctly identifying costs 
which are attributable being in work. These difficulties mean that there is inevitably 
a degree of uncertainty as to the exact size of these costs. Nevertheless, it is possible 
to draw on recent data to provide indications of the size of two of the main costs 
arising from work, travel to work and childcare costs. A recent working paper on in-
work costs in Ireland by Crilly, Pentecost and Tol (2012, henceforth CPT) attracted 
considerable public and media attention. We find, using more recent data and best 
practice methods, that the claims made in that paper are not borne out by the 
evidence. Key differences in our approaches include the following: 
 
19  A closer harmonisation of the estimates would be a valuable task for future research. 
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• Our methods for estimating the balance between incomes in and out of work 
follow best practice, as in previous work at the Institute for Fiscal Studies and 
the ESRI i.e., gross wages are predicted on the basis of the characteristics of the 
individual worker, and the implications for net income are examined using a 
detailed model of the tax and benefit system 
• We use data on childcare costs from the Survey on Income and Living Conditions 
2010, rather than the Household Budget Survey of 2004/5 
• Income data are drawn from SILC 2010 rather than SILC 2005 
• Our estimates of travel to work costs are based on the Household Budget Survey 
2009/10 rather than 2004/5; and we also make use of evidence from the 
National Travel Survey 2009 
 
In Section 5.1 we discuss the evidence on travel to work costs, using a number of 
approaches. Section 5.2 examines childcare costs, arriving at new estimates of the 
additional costs of childcare for those in full-time employment, based on recent 
data. Section 5.3 compares estimates of replacement rates as conventionally 
calculated (based on cash incomes and benefits) with estimates extended to take 
into account travel to work and childcare costs. 
 
5.1 Travel to Work Costs 
We draw on two main sources in seeking to identify the additional travel cost arising 
from an individual taking up employment (or the reduction in travel costs if an 
individual were to withdraw from employment). The National Travel Survey 2009 
(CSO, 2010) contains detailed information on journeys for different purposes and the 
distances travelled by those who are in work as against those who are unemployed. 
This can be combined with information on the costs of travel from the Household 
Budget Survey 2009/10 (CSO, 2012) to derive estimates of the costs of work-related 
travel. The National Travel Survey gathered detailed information on travel during a 
given reference day from a randomly selected individual within each household. The 
data gathered include: 
• the number of journeys made 
• the reason for making each journey (e.g., work, shopping, visiting friends or 
family) 
• the mode of transport used; and 
• the distance travelled 
 
Results from Census 2011 (CSO, 2012, Table 21) show that close to 7 out of 10 work-
related journeys are made by car, whether as a driver or as a passenger. Other 
modes include walking, cycling, public transport, use of a van provided by the 
employer. Typically these other modes of transport would cost less than travelling by 
Work  Incen t ives :  New E vidence for  I re land | 69  
car. In what follows, we focus on arriving at commuting costs based on car journeys, 
as the most prevalent mode of transport. 
 
Method 1: The National Travel Survey 2009 (CSO, 2011, Table 5) found that 
average distance travelled by those in employment was 94 kilometres per week 
more than the average distance for those who were unemployed. At the operating 
cost indicated by the AA (17.66 cent per kilometre for a car in Band A valued at 
around €12,000) this would come to an additional cost of €16.60 per week.20  
 
Method 2: An annual commuter ticket for Dublin bus services would cost just 
under €14 per week, if purchased using the "taxsaver" facility. A "short-hop" 
commuter rail ticket, combined with DART, LUAS and Dublin bus services would cost 
in the region of €17.50 after tax savings. A longer range commuter rail ticket, 
combined with DART, LUAS and Dublin bus services would cost about €25 per week 
after tax savings. 
 
Method 3: Griffin's (2011) analysis of the National Travel Survey data shows that 
work-related travel accounted for 1 in 4 of all journeys and for one-third of the total 
distance travelled. This includes both business travel and commuting, so the 
proportion of total distance travelled accounted for by travel to and from the place 
of work is less than 1 in 3. 
 
TABLE 7  Allocating Household Expenditure on Travel to Work-related Travel 
 Excludes vehicle purchases Excludes vehicle purchases, car tax 
and car insurance 
 € per week € per week 
Expenditure on travel* 77.5 55.0 
Attributable to work  
(1/3 of distance) 
25.8 18.3 
Per worker  
(1.02 workers per household) 
25.3 18.0 
 
*Excludes air travel, sea travel, taxis and car hire 
 
Prospective travel to work costs for a person who is unemployed or not at work 
should be the additional cost arising from the commuting. In some cases, an 
individual may not have access to a car, and might need to purchase a car in order to 
make the journey to work. However, the evidence suggests that this is not a typical 
situation. SILC data show that in about 60 per cent of cases, households containing 
 
20  Those who are in employment travel are likely to travel greater distances because of an income effect. This means that 
the true work-related cost would be lower than that used here. 
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an unemployed person have more cars than the number of persons at work. 
Furthermore, the Census records that 30 per cent of journeys are made by other 
modes of transport (including public transport, walking, cycling and employer 
provided vehicles). On this basis, Table 7 presents calculations of the relevant 
expenditure per worker, arriving at figures of €18 to €25 per week.  
 
Taking all three methods, with different sources of data, into account it is clear that a 
range of approximately €15 to €25 is a reasonable one for the costs of commuting. In 
our analysis we examine three options, referred to as low, medium and high travel 
costs: these correspond to €15, €20 and €25 per week. These well-grounded 
estimates, based on recent data, contrast with the figure of €80 per week used by 
CPT. 
 
Appendix 1 shows that travel to work costs at any of these 3 levels have quite limited 
impact on the incidence of high replacement rates. Further work in this area might 
look into geographic variations in work-related costs. Household Budget Survey data 
show clearly that higher overall costs are incurred in rural areas; but the extent to 
which work-related costs may be higher in rural areas is a question for further 
research. In what follows we use the central estimate of €20 per week as the basis 
for analysis of the combined impact of travel to work costs and childcare costs, to 
which we now turn. 
 
5.2  Childcare 
A study by Immervoll and Barber (2006) extended the OECD's illustrative examples 
of net financial rewards from employment to take a specific form of childcare cost 
into account: the fees charged by childcare centres for a two-year old child. Data on 
costs were from 2001. Our study improves on this in three respects:  
1. Data on actual costs paid by parents are used rather than supposedly typical 
costs  
2. The costs of childcare for all children aged 0 to 12 are taken into account  
3. The data we use are for 2010, so that recent changes in policy and patterns of 
childcare use are taken into account, including the provision of free pre-school 
places to more than 60,000 children under the Early Childhood Care and 
Education scheme. 
 
In order to understand the potential impact of childcare costs on the net reward 
from employment, we first consider evidence on the pattern of childcare use in 
Ireland. There are two main sources of information on childcare use and childcare 
costs: the Quarterly National Household Survey, which conducted a module on 
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Childcare in the 4th quarter of 2007, and the Survey on Income and Living Conditions 
for 2010. The QNHS has the most detailed information and a much larger sample of 
families with children, but the SILC has more recent information and allows us to 
explore issues related to rewards from employment in greater depth. 
 
Both QNHS and SILC find that substantial numbers of children are cared for by family 
members other than their parents, without payment. Appendix 2 shows that SILC 
and QNHS figures are close, both in terms of the proportion of children who are 
cared for using paid childcare, and the average household expenditure on childcare 
by those using paid childcare: about 1 child in 5 is cared for by paid childcare, and 
average household expenditure on childcare is in the region of €140 per week. This 
reinforces confidence in the use of the SILC figures for a closer examination of how 
childcare expenditures vary with work status. 
 
Adam and Browne (2010) note that 
"Deducting [childcare] expenditure from the measure of net income while working 
makes a considerable difference to the estimated work incentives of parents, but we 
do not follow this approach. This is partly because some parents spend money on 
childcare for non-work-related reasons, meaning that it would be wrong to assume 
that childcare expenditure would not be incurred were parents not to work."   
 
Here we take account of the fact that parents are observed to spend money on 
childcare even when one or both are available to care for the child(ren) themselves. 
For couples, we compare those where both partners are in full-time work, with 
situations in which one partner is at work, while the other is not. Correspondingly, 
when it comes to attributing a childcare cost, we attribute a zero childcare cost 
when one partner is not in employment and the other takes up a job.  
 
The dataset currently constructed for SWITCH includes information on working 
hours only for employees. There is also a small number of cases where respondents 
appear not to have provided data on hours, a not uncommon phenomenon in such 
surveys. We therefore use two strategies to identify couples where both are in full-
time work.  
• First, we use the hours information to exclude part-time workers, implicitly 
assuming that all those – mainly self-employed – for whom working hours are 
not available in our current dataset are in full-time work. (Group A) 
•  Second, we focus on the smaller group of couples where both are employees 
where there is definite information that both partners are working 30 hours per 
week or more. (Group B) 
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With Group A (full-time employees plus self-employed) there are sufficient numbers 
to distinguish between 5 different family types for the couples: those with one 
young child (aged 0 to 4), two or more young children, one primary school age child 
(aged 5 to 12), two primary school aged children, and those with a mixture of at least 
one young child and at least one primary school age child.21 With Group B (full-time 
employees), some of these cells would contain fewer than 30 cases and could not be 
reported for reasons of statistical confidentiality. We therefore provide a more 
aggregate picture (any child aged 5-12, one young child, and all other cases) for the 
smaller group. 
 
Table 8 shows the costs of childcare for different family types, as estimated by taking 
the difference in childcare expenditure by one-earner and two-earner couples. 
Individuals may move from zero to a high cost, but on average, a move from a mid-
ranking cost for a one earner couple to a mid-ranking cost for a two-earner couple is 
more representative. Both the median and the mean have a claim on our attention 
for this role. The median costs for all one-earner couples is zero, so that all of the 
median childcare costs are then being attributed to work-related childcare. 
 
TABLE 8  Childcare scenarios: Cost difference between 1-earner and 2-earner Couple 
 Group A: Full-time employees and 
all self-employed Group B: Full-time employees 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
 € per week 
One child 5-12 17 0 36 0 
Two children 5-12 66 0 36 0 
One child 0-4 94 135 97 135 
Two children 0-4 133 150 204 200 
Children of 0-4 & 5-12 143 100 204 200 
 
These estimates of the cost of childcare are substantially higher than those used by 
CPT. Despite the differences in the size and structure of childcare costs under these 
different approaches, the broad results are very similar across all four cases. 
 
The numbers of lone parents recording positive childcare expenditures in SILC are 
rather low. The levels of childcare expenditure, for those who do use paid childcare, 
are similar to those in the much larger Quarterly National Household Survey (CSO, 
2009). Average childcare costs for those lone parents using paid childcare in that 
survey (QNHS 2007, Childcare module) were between €100 and €128 per week. But 
while the SILC data for 2010 show similar expenditure levels, they suggest that a 
majority of lone parents, even if in paid employment, obtain childcare without a 
 
21  Because of patterns of family formation, the numbers in this latter category are low – about 10 per cent of families have 
both a young child and an older child. 
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payment. This may be from family or friends. If lone parents in employment are 
ranked by the size of their childcare payment, the middle-ranking person is found to 
make a zero payment. In the same way, the middle-ranked or "median" childcare 
payment for lone parents not in employment is also zero. If instead, the average or 
"mean" payments are compared, the average payment for those in employment is 
about €23 per week higher than the small average payment made by those out of 
employment.  
 
In our current analysis, we use the same, higher cost of childcare for lone parents as 
for couples e.g., €94 to €135 for a child aged under 5. This is to take account of the 
fact that those lone parents who are in employment may be a group which is partly 
selected on the basis of availability of family care. Those who are not in employment 
may therefore face higher cost options on average. We use the rate estimated for 
couples as a way of taking account of this potential factor. 
 
For those who are in employment, more precise information on childcare costs 
actually incurred is available in the survey. We use this information to broaden our 
analysis in two ways: 
1. We test out the implications of assuming that all childcare expenditures are 
work-related 
2. We compare this approach, using actual expenditures which vary greatly across 
families, to an approach based on assuming average additional costs, as outlined 
above. This helps to understand whether findings as regards the impact of 
childcare costs on the incidence of high replacement rates are much affected by 
whether an average cost or an actual costs are used. 
 
As shown in Appendix 2 results for the two approaches – actual cost and average 
additional cost – are very close. While not definitive, this suggests that the results 
based on average additional costs for those not at work may also be a good guide to 
the results which would obtain from more individualised predictions of childcare 
costs. Appendix 3 summarises the main differences between our approach and that 
of CPT. In the next sub-section, we examine the results based on our approach and 
contrast them with those of CPT. 
 
5.3 Impact of In-Work Costs on Replacement Rates 
In this subsection we look closely at the impact of the in-work costs on replacement 
rates. First, we examine impacts on the whole population – employees, unemployed 
and those who are not participating in the paid labour market. These results provide 
new and more reliable evidence on the questions posed by CPT. Then we return to 
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the unemployed group to examine the impact of the inclusion of in-work costs on 
the extent of high replacement rates among this group. 
 
TABLE 9  Estimates of the impact of in-work costs on the incidence of replacement rates above 100% 
 CPT(2012) Estimates from SWITCH,  
the ESRI tax-benefit model 
% with a young child, better off not in work  44% 12-13% 
% without a young child, better off not in work 15% 4% 
All  not reported 6% 
 
Note:  In work costs include travel to work (€20 per week) and childcare (as per Table 8) 
 
Table 9 summarises the key results from the CPT paper, and the corresponding 
findings from our work. Our results show clearly that the CPT approach substantially 
overestimated the numbers affected by the most extreme disincentives (a 
replacement rate of over 100%). We find that even among those with young 
children, the incidence of these extreme replacement rate is in the region of 12 to 13 
per cent, depending on the combination of assumptions used. This is less than one-
third of the incidence as estimated by CPT. Almost 7 out of 8 of those with young 
children would see a gain from being in employment, even after allowing for 
childcare costs and travel to work. 
 
For those without young children, we estimate the incidence at 4 per cent, again less 
than one-third of the rate estimated by CPT. Looking at the whole population – those 
in employment, the unemployed, and those who are not seeking paid employment –
we find that close to 95 per cent would gain financially from employment. Only 6 per 
cent would not be financially better off in work, using calculations which take into 
account childcare costs and travel to work. This is much closer to the "without 
children" figure because those with young children are a minority of the overall 
population. 
 
Who faces high or very high replacement rates? 
Who are the individuals facing high or very high replacement rates? Discussion of 
this topic often focuses on the idea that individuals who are financially better off not 
working will therefore be found "on the dole". This is not the case, as shown by 
Table 10. About 7 out of 8 of those with high (over 70%) replacement rates are not in 
receipt of any Jobseeker payment. Six out of 10 of those in this situation are actually 
in employment. Only 1 in 8 of those who are estimated to be financially worse off in 
employment22 is found to be in receipt of unemployment benefits. Almost 3 out of 4 
of those who are financially "worse off" in employment, are actually at work, with 
 
22  The net current reward from employment is zero, when account is taken of childcare and travel costs.  
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the balance (again about 1 in 8) found to be outside the paid labour market. One of 
the reasons for staying in work in such situations is that this protects and/or 
enhances future earnings, which could be damaged by withdrawing from 
employment. 
 
TABLE 10  Working or Receiving Benefit? Profiling those with High/Very High Replacement Rates 
Replacement rate over 70% Replacement Rate over 100% 
Employee 60 Employee 74 
JA/JB Recipient 13 JA/JB Recipient 17 
"Home duties" 28 "Home duties" 9 
 
 
TABLE 11  Impact of alternative childcare costs, and travel to work cost (€20 pw) on replacement rates for 
those who are unemployed and receiving Jobseeker's Benefit or Allowance  
Replacement rate above: No in-work costs 
€20 travel to work cost and childcare costs based on 
full-time employees  
Mean Median 
 % of unemployed persons with replacement rate above cut-off 
>70% 28.5 34.6 34.6 
>80% 20.3 23.7 23.7 
>90% 14.3 17.5 17.6 
>100% 7.8 12.0 12.2 
 
Table 11 identifies the impact of childcare costs and travel to work costs on 
replacement rates facing those who are unemployed. The inclusion of both travel to 
work costs and childcare costs in the mix leads to a greater incidence of high 
replacement rates. The proportion facing replacement rates over 70 per cent rises by 
with a 6 percentage points, with a rise of up to 4½ percentage point rise in the 
proportion facing replacement rates above 100 per cent. While these results are 
much more limited in scale than was suggested by CPT, they show that for a minority 
of the unemployed, childcare costs can contribute to a significant disincentive to 
work. The policy issues arising from this deserve further investigation, now that the 
scale of the issue has been accurately assessed. 
 
6 CONCLUSION 
More than 3 out of 4 individuals in Ireland have replacement rates below 70%, 
meaning that income in work is more than 40% higher than out of work income. 
About one-third of those who are unemployed or not at work have replacement 
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rates above 70% - fewer than a similar study found for the UK.23 High replacement 
rates were more common in 2005, when the unemployment rate was 4 per cent, 
than in 2012, when unemployment had reached 14 per cent. Ireland does not have a 
generalised problem of high replacement rates damaging incentives to work. There 
are however, significant numbers of individuals facing very high replacement rates 
(over 90 or 100 per cent). Many of these arise because of the Rent and Mortgage 
Supplement Scheme, which pays a housing cost supplement to those who are not in 
work, but rarely provides support to those who are in employment. The IMF 
concludes that "The highest replacement rates affect those also receiving housing 
benefits. To avoid unemployment and inactivity traps for this cohort, it is important 
to integrate the systems of social housing provision and rent supplement for those 
with long-term housing needs into a new means-tested Housing Assistance 
Payment." We agree with this analysis. The design of an integrated housing support 
is a matter of urgency. 
 
 
 
It is our contention that results from the OECD database have been misinterpreted 
by both the OECD and the IMF, each of which maintains that Ireland's long-run 
replacement rates are high by international standards. We find, using the OECD's 
own statistics, that replacement rates for Ireland are close to typical values for EU15 
countries, and document the factors which make the simpler comparisons 
unrepresentative. 
 
 
 
What impact do in-work costs, such as childcare and travel to work costs, have on 
the net financial reward from employment? We examined this issue using recent 
data and "best practice" methods. We found that the paper on "costs of working" 
(Crilly, Pentecost and Tol, 2012 – CPT) greatly overestimated the impact of these 
costs on financial incentives to work. CPT stated that 44 per cent of those with young 
children would be better off out of work, but our analysis, based on more recent 
data and best practice methods, shows a figure of 12 to 13 per cent. Furthermore, 
we find that a majority of those who are potentially better off out of employment 
are actually in employment. Only about 1 in 4 of those facing high disincentives is 
receiving a Jobseeker payment. 
 
 
 
Policy debate in the area of work incentives can easily be misled by concentrating on 
particular examples. Policy making needs to pay careful attention to evidence which 
is nationally representative, such as that provided in this study. 
 
23  Adam and Browne (2010) found that 37 per cent of those who were unemployed or not at work faced replacement rates 
of 70 per cent or more in the UK. 
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APPENDIX 1  Exploring the Impact of Commuting Costs 
Table A1.1 examines the impact of alternative travel to work costs on replacement 
rates.  
 
TABLE A1.1  Impact of alternative travel to work costs on replacement rates for all employees and those not at 
work 
  Replacement rates including travel to work cost 
 Cash replacement 
rate 
€15 €20 €25 
>70% 23 25 26 26 
>80% 13 14 15 15 
>90% 7 8 8 9 
>100% 4 5 5 5 
 
Table 12 shows that the net impact of travel costs on the incidence of high 
replacement rate is quite small. This is true even at the higher end of the range (€25 
per week). While for some individuals travel costs may be an important 
consideration, survey evidence shows that the overall impact on replacement rates 
is not large. 
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APPENDIX 2  Childcare Costs: Evidence from QNHS 2007 and SILC 2010 
TABLE A2.1  Childcare Costs, QNHS 2007 and SILC 2010 
 Childcare module, QNHS 
2007, 4th Quarter 
SILC 2010 
% of all children aged 0-12 using paid 
childcare  
22% 20% 
Average expenditure per household per 
week for those using paid childcare 
€144 €139 
 
Both QNHS and SILC find that close to 4 out of 5 children are cared for without the 
use of paid childcare – either directly by parents, or by family members without 
payment. Estimates of average expenditure per household are also very similar, at 
about €140 per week.  
 
In terms of paid childcare, there is great diversity in levels of payments both within 
and between modes of care. Very many children are cared for by childminders, in 
their own homes or in the minders' homes. Table A2.1 documents, for those parents 
who are purchasing paid childcare, the proportions at various levels of cost: 
 
TABLE A2.2 Variation in childcare payments across households 
Childcare expenditure per week % of households 
Under €40 21% 
€40 to €85 29% 
€85 to €150 20% 
€150 to 200 14% 
Over€ 200 16% 
 
There is wide variation in cost levels, with about half paying less than €85 per week, 
and 7 out of 10 paying less than €150 per week. About 1 in 6 paid more than €200 
per week. 
App endix  | 81  
APPENDIX 3  Comparison of Methods and Data Sources 
Table A3.1 summarises how our approach to the identification of in-work costs and 
their impact differs from that of CPT. The differences in data sources used are 
relatively straightforward: we use more recent data, with better quality information 
on work-related transport and childcare. CPT estimated the additional childcare cost 
of one child under 4 as €43 per week. Our findings, based on more recent evidence 
than CPT, suggest an additional cost of childcare for a child under 5 of close to €95 
per week. At the same time the CPT estimates of travel to work cost appear 
implausible, with more recent data suggesting a figure of €15 to €25 per week as 
compared with the €80 used in CPT. Thus, the approach adopted by CPT to 
identifying work-related costs (regression with income and other controls, and a 
change in the status of the Chief Economic Supporter from out of work to in work) 
arrives at estimates of travel costs that are too high, and childcare costs which are 
too low. These errors do not "cancel out" because travel costs affect everyone, while 
the costs of young children affect a much smaller number of families. There is no 
reason to believe that the method used by CPT is any more reliable in estimating 
costs associated with clothing and with takeaway food. As regards clothing, it is 
arguable that some jobs need uniforms; some need smart clothes; many others need 
ordinary clothes which do not impose a work-related cost. We do not attempt to 
make adjustments for these items, as the strength of the case for them is much 
weaker, and international discussion of these issues does not focus on them. 
 
An additional advantage of this paper's approach is that it is grounded in best 
practice internationally in the measurement of work incentives. Each family's 
situation in and out of work is simulated in detail – allowing for the impact of in-
work welfare benefits such as Family Income Supplement as well as out of work 
benefits such as Jobseeker's Allowance and Jobseeker's Benefit. The careful 
construction of counterfactual scenarios under this approach gives a more accurate 
picture of the gaps between income in-work and out-of-work than the "reduced 
form" regression of net incomes used by CPT. 
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TABLE A3.1  Data and methods used to identify in-work costs and their impact: CPT (2012) approach and our 
approach 
 CPT approach 1 Our approach 
Travel to 
work costs 
Data source(s) HBS 2004/5 National Travel Survey 2009 and HBS 
2009/10 
 Identification of 
additional costs 
associated with an 
additional job 
Regression coefficient for 
in-work status of "Chief 
Economic Supporter" of 
household 
Three alternatives, based on mileage, 
public transport options and one-third 
share of relevant household transport 
costs (equal to share of work-related 
travel in total travel distance) 
Childcare 
costs 
Data source HBS 2004/5 SILC 2010 
 Identification of 
costs of childcare 
Regression coefficient for 
in-work status of "Chief 
Economic Supporter" of 
household 
Actual costs of childcare for those in 
employment. 
Average additional costs of childcare for 
2-earner couple (full-time) over 1-earner 
couple for others. 
In- and 
out-of-
work 
incomes 
Data source SILC 2005  SILC 2010 
 Prediction of out-
of-work income of 
those in work 
Reduced form equation 
for net income. 
Variables do not include 
age. 
Change in income based 
on coefficient for in-work 
status of "Chief Economic 
Supporter". 
Prediction based on SWITCH tax-benefit 
model, taking individual and family 
circumstances into account 
 Prediction of in-
work income for 
those not at work 
Gross wage predicted using age, highest 
educational qualification, gender, marital 
status. 
Tax and welfare implications traced 
through using detailed tax-benefit model 
(SWITCH). 
Childcare 
cost 
attribution 
 Childcare costs 
attributed (Figure 2) to 
all those with children of 
relevant age. 
Childcare costs attributed only to those 
with children of relevant age, and in the 
case of couples, only when there are two 
earners (full-time or part-time). 
 
  
 
1  Crilly, Pentecost, Tol (2012) 
App endix  | 83  
APPENDIX A4 Impact of Actual and Average Childcare Costs on Replacement Rates 
TABLE A4.1  Impact of alternative childcare costs, and travel to work cost (€20 pw) on replacement rates for 
all employees  
  Childcare costs 
 Cash replacement rate Actual 
Average, Full-time 
employees and self-
employed 
>70% 20 25 25 
>80% 11 15 16 
>90% 7 8 10 
>100% 4 5 7 
 
 
Table A4.1 shows that childcare costs, combined with travel to work costs, do make 
a difference to the replacement rate distribution for employees. The proportion 
facing replacement rates of over 70 per cent rises from 18 per cent to 23 per cent, 
and the proportion facing the highest replacement rate rises from 4 to 6 per cent. 
Nonetheless, more than 3 out of 4 employees face replacement rates below 70 per 
cent. 
 
There is, however, little difference between proportions with replacement rate 
above 70 or 80 per cent when estimated using actual childcare costs or average costs 
(for Group A, those who are definitely not part timers). For the highest cut offs (90 
and 100 per cent), the proportions are higher when using the average additional cost 
approach. These results is of particular significance when it comes to interpreting 
results for those unemployed or not at work. 
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